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Concurrency faults are one of the most damaging types of faults that can affect
the dependability of today’s computer systems. Currently, concurrency faults such
as process-level races, order violations, and atomicity violations represent the largest
class of faults that has been reported to various Linux bug repositories. Clearly,
existing approaches for testing such faults during software development processes are
not adequate as these faults escape in-house testing efforts and are discovered during
deployment and must be debugged.
The main reason concurrency faults are hard to test is because the conditions
that allow these to occur can be difficult to replicate, causing them to appear non-
deterministically. Once these faults have been discovered during deployment and
reported back to engineers, they are still very challenging to reproduce for the same
reason. Furthermore, since concurrency faults can be complex, it is difficult for users
to diagnose faults correctly. This can lead to bug reports that do not contain sufficient
information or are totally incorrect.
The goal of this dissertation is to make the process of reproducing concurrency
faults more effective and efficient. Effectiveness means that we can reproduce faults
more deterministically, and engineers can continue to debug applications in spite of
incomplete reports. Efficiency means that using our proposed approaches, engineers
take less time to perform the debugging process. This includes less time to develop
detectors, less time to identify applications that can instigate reported faults, and
less time to run the applications to reproduce reported faults. The results of our
empirical evaluations reveal that the proposed systems collectively allow concurrency
fault reproduction to be more effective, efficient, and accurate.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Concurrency faults are difficult to detect and debug because they are sensitive to
execution interleavings. Process-level races and atomicity violations, where multiple
processes access operating system resources without proper synchronization and
protection, are particularly challenging to handle. A process-level race occurs when
multiple processes access a system-wide shared resource (e.g., file, device, hardware
register) without proper synchronization. Atomicity violations occur when there is
execution interference by two or more processes or threads on a block of statements that
must be executed atomically. A study of real world concurrency fault characteristics [1]
revealed that atomicity violations are the most common causes of concurrency faults.
Prior work also found that under-constrained process interactions can lead to both
issues [2].
There are existing race and atomicity violation detectors that have been designed
for a specific language or to operate at the thread level. However, they may not be
able to detect and reproduce such faults due to heterogeneous environments. This is
2because races and atomicity violations at the process level can occur across different
applications written in different languages and accessing diverse resources. In addition,
detection and reproduction of races or atomicity violations require observability of
shared memory accesses and synchronization operations. Furthermore, process-level
races and atomicity violations can occur in kernel services (e.g., system call routines
and device drivers) that are not observable by software engineers. Finally, these faults
can occur at times well past system deployment due to changes in system configurations.
Because the scenarios in which process-level races and atomicity violations can occur
are complex, these faults often elude in-house testing efforts and remain undiscovered
until after system deployment. For example, up to 73% of all races reported after
deployment in various Linux distributions are process-level races [3].
To avoid these faults (in this proposal, we simply refer to process-level races and
atomicity violations as “faults”), developers often use various synchronization primitives
(e.g., semaphores, spin-locks, barriers) to synchronize accesses to shared resources. In
effect, these mechanisms allow only one process to access a shared resource at a time,
and thus, prevent such faults from occurring. However, serializing accesses to shared
resources can also result in over-constrained process interactions [2], leading to two
additional problems. First, adding synchronization primitives can lead to deadlocks
or livelocks [4]. Second, serially accessing shared resources can lead to excessive lock
contention, resulting in long delays for processes that try to access a shared resource
while it is being accessed by another process. A prior study has shown that lock
contention can slow down an access to a shared resource by between 10 times (on
a single CPU system) and 50 times (on a multiprocessor system) [5]. While such
contention may not produce incorrect results, these delays can lead to various types
of Quality of Experience (QoE ) faults ranging from minor annoyances such as long
3delays in shutting a system down [6,7, 8, 9, 10, 11] to intermittent system reboots due
to timing violations [12,13,14,15]).
When faults due to over- or under-constrained process interactions are discovered,
they are typically reported to engineers. Examples of bug reports describing such
faults can be found in various bug repositories including those for Linux distributions
such as Red Hat, Ubuntu and Debian. In most cases, bug reports include only
general descriptions of symptoms, while in other cases, bug reports are more detailed
and provide inputs that cause the faults. Engineers use this information to identify
potential sources of faults (e.g., file systems, network stacks, or device drivers) and
attempt to reproduce them as part of the debugging process. Unfortunately, reported
information alone is often not sufficient to reproduce faults. For example, we have
encountered cases in which 50,000 execution instances cannot reproduce a reported
fault due to the small execution interleaving windows that must occur in order for the
faults to manifest themselves.
In practice, when attempting to reproduce faults, engineers often use sleep or
sched_yield calls to pause the execution of pairs of processes [16, 17], to amplify
the chances of enforcing execution windows that lead to those faults. Inserting yield
points at the source code level, however, is an error-prone approach when dealing
with such faults. Shared resource usage can be implicit ; that is, an application may
make a request to use a shared resource indirectly by invoking a system call that
invokes another system call to access the resource. Therefore, engineers may miss
the opportunity to observe the behavior of an implicit system call if they fail to
insert a yield point prior to the event that can result in that call. While a record
and replay approach [3] has been used to detect concurrency faults such as races and
atomicity violations, engineers may fail to observe problems due to replay divergence –
a mismatch between the actual actions recorded in a trace and the modified actions
4intended to enforce execution windows. Replay divergence occurs when engineers
directly modify a trace of a program’s execution and cannot replay it after the
modifications [3].
It is worth noting that over the past decade, much research has been conducted
on techniques that facilitate detection of concurrency faults, and especially races
(e.g, [18, 19, 20, 21,22, 23,24, 25]). These techniques can dynamically observe events of
interest and then analyze information collected from those observations to determine
whether races occur. However, most existing techniques focus on multi-threaded
applications within single processes, and have not been adapted to handle process-level
race conditions such as races caused by improper shared resource accesses among
multiple processes, software signals and hardware interrupts.
Synchronization related faults can also involve more than two pairs of shared
resource accesses. In such cases, to localize faults based on a reported symptom,
engineers need to first identify applications that can access the same shared resources.
Often, a bug report includes the application that encountered the fault but not the
other applications that access the same resources, causing concurrency faults to occur.
(We will tackle this challenge in our third approach) In the case in which engineers are
somehow able to identify these applications, they then need to identify code locations
that share a resource and then observe the behavior of each pair-wise access to the
shared resource. (A pair-wise access is the minimum requirement for exposing a race
or atomicity violation [1].) If engineers fail to exercise any pair-wise accesses, they may
be unable to reproduce the reported races, atomicity violations, or resource contention,
and also unable to identify other locations that can possibly cause additional faults
on the same shared resource.
To effectively and efficiently reproduce faults, it follows that engineers need a bug
reproduction framework that allows them to effectively debug faults by observing system-
5level events such as system calls and signals that occur during program execution,
without encountering replay divergence. This will allow them to uncover both explicit
and implicit system calls that might be relevant to the faults they are trying to
reproduce. They also need an approach for automatically mapping system-level events
to invocation points in source code and inserting yield points prior to and after those
invocation points. They then need to be able to guide the interleaving execution
toward reported faults.
Once a bug reproduction system is in place, the second challenge in race reproduc-
tion is for engineers to develop detectors that can detect the presence of targeted faults
when trying to debug two or more applications. The current approach is to develop
oracles; this can be laborious as the nature of these faults may receive engineers to
develop a customized detector for each type of race or atomicity violation. In our
empirical work, to reproduce races in 20 pairs of applications, we needed to develop
16 detectors. As developers try to debug more races, the collection of detectors would
undoubtedly grow larger. To simplify this process, it would be useful to develop a
generic detector that can address different classes of races.
A third challenge in race or atomicity violation reproduction is that a bug report
may not provide sufficient information to identify the pair of applications that can race.
Instead, the report may provide the race symptoms experienced by an application but
fail to identify the other application(s) that could race with it. To reproduce such
races, it is critical for engineers to identify applications that can possibly race with
the program under debug (PuD). Thus, we need a system that can help an engineer
identify applications that can be used to instigate a reported fault within a universe of
applications that are accessible by the engineer.
61.2 Approaches
To effectively reproduce concurrency faults, we introduce three approaches to ad-
dress the aforementioned challenges. To address the first challenge, we introduce a
reproduction framework for use in debugging races, deadlocks, and excessive synchro-
nization delays (RCRF), a race reproduction framework to assist with debugging races,
deadlocks, and excessive synchronization delays. RCRF is a partially automated
framework that identify accesses to the same shared resources. Our approach uses
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) as oracles to determine the faults. To enable observ-
ability and controllability, the framework uses static analysis tools to inject delays to
create interleavings between the processes that are likely to result in races.
To address the second challenge, we extend the framework by statically analyzing
applications containing previously reported faults. We found that atomicity violations
occur frequently in these applications. It is worth noting that our observation also
corresponds to a prior result reported by Lu et al. [1]. As such, we extend RCRF to
also incorporate an atomicity detection algorithm based on reaching definition (RD)
analysis in addition to LTL. We refer to this algorithm as "reaching definition on
system call logs" (RDSC). The system call logs are generated by running applications.
Because many types of races are the results of atomicity violations, we anticipate
that RDSC can also help reduce the developer’s efforts in constructing customized
detectors to meet the specifications of particular reported races. This can further
simplify the race reproduction process.
To address the third challenge, we leverage our insights into various types of
process-level races so that we can classify various patterns of races that can help us
determine whether races can occur between a pair of applications. Based on this insight,
we propose our third approach; which helps software engineers identify applications
7that can interact with each other. Our approach leverages existing machine learning
algorithms to construct classifiers that can determine whether an arbitrary application
can race with a PuD based on resource usage analysis and features.
1.3 Contributions
The intended contributions for this proposed works are as follows:
1. We present RCRF, a reproduction framework for use in debugging races, dead-
locks, and excessive synchronization delays. RCRF can help software engineers
reproduce reported process-level races, deadlocks, and quality of experience
(QoE) faults that occur because of excessive delays due to contention, enabling
them to potentially debug these faults. RCRF performs a hybrid analysis by
leveraging existing static program analysis tools, dynamic kernel event reporting
tools, and yield points to provide the observability and controllability needed
to reproduce these faults. We conducted an empirical study to evaluate RCRF;
our results show that RCRF can be effective for reproducing our targeted
synchronization related faults. The detail of this framework is proposed in
Chapter 4
2. We develop RDSC by extending RCRF to include a generic detector based
on reaching definitions analysis (RD) to detect races and atomicity violations.
RD is a data flow analysis on the source code of a program to track the values
of variables flowing on the execution paths. Compilers use RD to check for
uninitialized, and unused variables. We apply RD to the trace of dynamic
kernel event logs of concurrency processes. The interleavings between processes
may violate atomicity. The definitions obtained with RD can help us find the
8origins of races. We present the algorithm, empirical study, and results of this
work in Chapter 5.
3. For the last part of this work, we develop CFI, a concurrency fault classification
to analyze patterns of real-world process-level races and atomicity violations.
Because these faults occur at deployment across shared resources, it is possible
for any arbitrary pair of applications to race. We envision that our proposed
classification framework can help engineers reproduce faults when the bug report
does not provide sufficient details to do so. Our system identifies potential
faults that can occur between a universe of applications that can interact with
our PuD on the same system, and therefore, increase the effectiveness of RCRF.
We present the algorithm, empirical study, and results of this work in Chapter 6.
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General Background
In this section, we provide relevant background information related to races and
atomicity violations and their reproduction. However, we first define common types
of faults that occurs due to improper concurrency management.
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Race
We define a process-level race as a race that occurs when (1) two processes access a
shared resource, and (2) they could have accessed the shared resource in an order
different from the original order. This definition of a race is broader than the standard
definition [17,26]. Our definition also includes order violations, in which the desired
order of shared resource accesses is reversed and the accesses may or may not be
protected by a common lock [1,27]. An order violation is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for a race.
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2.1.2 Atomicity Violation
Atomicity is a property that governs execution of a block of code (B) consisting of
a sequence of instructions in a program. Atomicity is preserved if the outcome of
concurrently executing B is equivalent to the outcome of serially executing B. If this
property is not preserved, atomicity is violated [4, 28].
2.1.3 Contention
We define synchronization contention as an event that occurs when one or more
processes try to access a shared resource that is already being accessed by a process,
and that particular process holds the exclusive right to that resource at that time. As
such, other processes attempting to access the resource would either be suspended
until the resource is available or would repeatedly try to access the resource ("spin")
until they are successful. A synchronization delay refers to the amount of time that
a process must wait, either through suspension or spinning, to access the currently
claimed shared resource [4]. With contention, there are no detectable output faults.
However, delays may result in functional faults that can cause a system to prematurely
terminate [12] or non-functional faults that can degrade performance [29,30]. We refer
to this type of fault as a Quality of Experience (QoE ) fault.
2.1.4 Deadlock
Our definition of deadlock follows the common definition: deadlock occurs when two
or more processes are each waiting for the other to release a shared resource [4].
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2.2 Distinction between Race and Atomicity
Violations
In the context of our work, we focus on detecting races and atomicity violations that
occur on resources shared by multiple processes. Some of these resources include data
structures maintained by the operating system such as file and signal data structures
which can be accessed via system calls. To identify potential sources of races, we need
to first model system calls that can access resources of interest. Identifying a resource
of interest is based on a fault description such as these that can be found in a bug
repository. We then consider each system call that can access a particular resource of
interest as a basic operation that can cause races.
With respect to atomicity violations, we consider a sequence of system calls that
must be performed atomically to preserve correctness. As an example, a typical file
access requires a number of system calls (shown in Figure 2.1) that must be performed
atomically to preserve correctness. An atomicity violation can occur if another process
(P1) can modify the intermediate state of the file data structure while a process (P0)
is trying to access the file. This can result in an unstable intermediate state. On
the other hand, if we are trying to identify the source of a race that can result in
corruption of an output file, we may focus only on the write system call as it is the
only one that performs the write to the output file.
12
Properly atomic process Atomicity violation
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Figure 2.1: A typical file access with proper synchronization and an atomicity violation
2.3 Reproducing Races and Atomicity Violations at
the Process Level
In practice, when attempting to reproduce faults, engineers often use sleep or
sched_yield calls to pause the execution of pairs of processes [16, 17], to increase
the chances of enforcing execution windows that lead to those faults. Inserting yield
points at the source code level, however, is an error-prone approach when dealing with
such faults. Shared resource usage can be implicit ; that is, an application may make
a request to use a shared resource indirectly by invoking a system call that invokes
another system call to access the resource. Engineers may miss the opportunity to
observe the behavior of an implicit system call if they fail to insert a yield point prior
to the event that can result in that call. While a record and replay approach [3] has
been used to detect process-level races, engineers may fail to observe problems due to
replay divergence – a mismatch between the actual actions recorded in a trace and the
modified actions intended to enforce execution windows. Replay divergence occurs
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when engineers directly modify a trace of a program’s execution and cannot replay it
after the modifications [3].
2.4 Race and Atomicity Violation Detection
Techniques
It is worth noting that over the past decade, much research has been conducted on
techniques that facilitate race and atomicity violation detection (e.g, [18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23,24,25,28,28,31,32,33,34,35]). These techniques can dynamically observe events of
interest and then analyze information collected from those observations to determine
whether races occur. However, most existing techniques focus on multi-threaded
applications within single processes, and have not been adapted to handle process-level
race conditions such as races caused by improper shared resource accesses among
multiple processes, software signals and hardware interrupts.
Synchronization related faults can also involve more than two pairs of shared
resource accesses. In such cases, to localize races based on a reported symptom,
engineers need to identify locations that share the same resource and then observe
the behavior of each pair-wise access to the shared resource. (A pair-wise access
is the minimum requirement for exposing a race [1].) If engineers fail to exercise
any pair-wise accesses, they may not only be unable to reproduce the reported races
or contention, but also unable to identify other locations that can possibly cause
additional faults on the same shared resource.
It follows that engineers need a bug reproduction framework that allows them to
effectively debug faults by to observing system-level events such as system calls and
signals that occur during program execution, without encountering replay divergence.
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This will allow them to uncover both explicit and implicit system calls that might be
relevant to the faults they are trying to reproduce. They also need an approach for
automatically mapping system-level events to invocation points in source code and
inserting yield points prior to and after these invocation points. They then need to be
able to guide the interleaving execution toward reported faults.
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Chapter 3
Exploring Real-World Executable
Concurrency Faults
This chapter describes the process we took to explore real-world concurrency faults
and collect real-world executable applications to be used to evaluate our proposed
systems.
3.1 Application Selection Process
To gain a better understanding of real-world concurrency faults and collect experimental
objects that can be used in our studies, we needed to locate applications that meet
the following three criteria:
1. There must be known faults in these applications and basic descriptions of
those faults.
2. The faults must be within the scope of the classes of faults and the types of
shared resources we want to target.
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3. We must be able to execute the applications and modify them according to our
experimental processes.
To select applications we turned to several bug report repositories, including those
for Red Hat, Ubuntu, Debian, and GNU, and searched them using the keywords “race”,
“concurrency”, “file”, “signal”, “socket”, “contention”, “deadlock”, “priority inversion”,
“quality of service”, and “glitches”. With respect to collecting objects with QoE faults,
we focused on multimedia applications as they are likely to suffer from QoE faults such
as runtime glitches, long start-up or shut-down delays, or excessive delays between
playing media files. We considered only bug reports related to code written in C,
C++, or shell scripting language.
For each case considered, we analyzed the bug reports to determine what pairs of
programs were involved in causing the reported faults. We then narrowed our focus
further to bug reports that involve resources that we want to focus on. These resources
include files or network sockets that are shared among multiple processes. We did this
because in practice, detecting races on a particular type of resource requires that we
be able to observe accesses to that resource type. In this work, we focus only on types
of shared resources in which we can commonly find faults. However, we design our
proposed solutions as frameworks so they can also be extended to generically cover
other types of shared resources.
Finally, we replicated the environments needed to potentially reproduce these
faults by creating shell scripts and processes that can possibly exploit these faults
(e.g., if a fault is suspected to be due to a signal, we create a program that sends the
signal based on our configured frequency).
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Table 3.1: Basic Characteristics of Object Programs
Program Pair
Program 1 LoC Program 2 LoC Type of Races
updatedb (s) 14,405 updatedb (s) 14,405 Improper Synchronization on
share resources
locate (c) 14,643 updatedb (s) 14,405 Improper Synchronization on i
share resources
bash (s) 144,536 bash (s) 144,536 Improper Synchronization on
share resources
mv (c) 47,023 rm (c) 45,850 Improper Synchronization on
share resources
rm(fts) (c) 69,524 symlink (s) 3 TOCTTOU and improper
link resolution before file access
mkdir (c) 29,095 cleaner (c) 13 TOCTTOU and improper
link resolution before file access
mknod (c) 29,307 cleaner (c) 13 TOCTTOU and improper
link resolution before file access
mkfifo (c) 28,972 cleaner (c) 13 TOCTTOU and improper
link resolution before file access
mkdir2 (c) 35,970 cleaner (c) 13 TOCTTOU and improper
link resolution before file access
mknod2 (c) 36,201 cleaner (c) 13 TOCTTOU and improper
link resolution before file access
mkfifo2 (c) 35,828 cleaner (c) 13 TOCTTOU and improper
link resolution before file access
ln (c) 56,978 cleaner (c) 13 TOCTTOU and improper
link resolution before file access
find (c) 22,929 cleaner2 (c) 8 TOCTTOU and improper
resolution before file access
csplit (c) 29,905 msigshooter (c) 46 Signal Handler Race Condition
pxz (c) 407 stealer (s) 6 Bypass a restriction or privilege
escalation
logrotate (c) 3,722 stealer2 (s) 4 Bypass a restriction or privilege
escalation
ps (c) 110,761 grep_script (s) 5 Inevitable race on a shared pipe
between processes
mar_high (c) 183 mar_low (c) 183 Priority inversion
mixxx (cpp) 350,730 mixxx (cpp) 350,730 Poor QoE on Media Player
multithread (c) 1,141,835 multithread (c) 1,141,835 Deadlock from two mutex
variables in GLIBC
3.2 Selected Applications
The pairs of programs that meet our three selection criteria are shown in Table 3.1.
In the table, the character(s) in parentheses after the application name indicate(s)
whether the application is a C program (C), a shell script (S), or a C++ Program
(CPP). We also report other basic characteristics of the objects including lines of
code (LoC) and the types of faults that have been reported. As we run each pair
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of programs, we also needed to log OS related runtime events that can be used to
detect faults. As such, we created an experimental environment that supports multiple
kernels and can work with different tools to monitor runtime behaviors. For example,
we used Scribe to monitor runtime events for the first 17 pairs of applications. We
then used Strace for the last three pairs of applications. We also used the Gentoo
2.6.35 kernel to run 18 pairs of apps, the Ubuntu 3.0.101-rt130 real-time kernel to run
MAR_HIGH and MAR_LOW, and Ubuntu 3.0.0-12 to run the pair of MIXXX
application. Each pair of applications has particular behaviors when they interact
with each other, as we describe next.
3.2.1 Under-constrained Process Interaction Faults
A pair of updatedb processes from version 4.1.20 [36] can race with each other
while performing database updates. This classic race occurs when one of the two
updatedb processes, without proper synchronization of file accesses, naively modifies
the database while the other is using it.
locate [37] is an application from version 4.1.20 of the GNU Find Utilities. This
GNU package provides a modular directory and file search system. locate is used to
locate all types of files in the system based on a database created by updatedb (also
from version 4.1.20 of the GNU Find Utilities). A bug report indicates that these two
can race, causing the database file to be prematurely deleted by updatedb.
bash (Bourne Again Shell version 3.0) [38] is an sh-compatible shell for Unix
operating systems. Like other shells, bash works as a command manager. It receives
command lines from a user through standard input devices such as the keyboard or
mouse, sends these commands to the operating system, and interacts with the user
by displaying results on an output device such as the monitor. By default, bash can
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save a history file as a log for the system or the developer to use. The reported race
in this program occurs when two instances of bash interact, causing the history file
to be corrupted.
mv and rm are applications from version 6.9 of the GNU Core Utilities [39]. mv
is a basic Unix command used to move files from a source location to a destination
location. rm is a basic Unix command that deletes files. Typically, to perform atomic
file replacement using a shell script, rm, ln, and mv are used in sequence. However,
an implementation change in mv in coreutils-6.9-16.fc8 creates a race in a commonly
used atomic rename script. When a race occurs, the link previously created is removed
before the file is moved, causing the source file for the mv operation to be missing.
rm (or remove [40]) is a command from GNU Coreutils 8.4, designed to remove
files and directories recursively. Using the option -r or -R, the rm command can
hierarchically delete a file from a given location in the root directory. The race that can
occur with this program is classified as a TOCTTOU race. When the race occurs, the
directory traversing status will be NOFOLLOW, meaning that there are no symbolic links
or symlinks underneath the root directory and the deletion can proceed. This race
allows attackers to create a symlink, causing the deletion of the symlink target. We
created a shell script, symlink, to create a symbolic link inside an existing directory
and act like an attacker in this scenario.
mkdir, mknod, and mkfifo [41] are basic commands from GNU Core Utils 5.2.1.
mkdir is used to create a directory or a structure of directories. This command
provides an option -m to specify the priority of directories. These two steps should be
atomic, but instead there is a gap between them that can allow another application to
interfere between the two steps and modify the resource. In this particular scenario,
cleaner, a simple shell script, can interfere and remove the newly created directory
that mkdir tries to set a priority on. There are also other commands that can suffer
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from a similar atomicity violation. mknod works as a device special file creator with
the same option -m. It has the same defect as mkdir. mkfifo is used to create a
FIFO pipeline, again with the option -m. It can also suffer from the same atomicity
violation.
Commands mkdir2 [42], mknod2, and mkfifo2 also suffer from the same atom-
icity violation previously reported. However, these implementations are from a later
package, GNU Core Utils 5.97.
ln [43] is used to create a link between two files. This is an application from
GNU Core Utils 5.94. A race can occur in this command as a file can be removed
before a new symlink is created. This is also a classic TOCTTOU race.
find [44] is a utility application from GNU FindUtils 4.1.20. It can be used
to locate files. A race can occur on the internal file structure as another process
(cleaner2 in this case) can simultaneously modify the structure causing find to fail.
csplit [45] is an application from GNU Core Utils 5.2.0. A bug report indicates
that an interrupt signal, SIGINT, can create a race on file deletion, leaving a temporary
file to remain in the system instead of being deleted. To create this race, we created
mSigShooter, a customized application that instigates an Interrupt Signal (SIGINT)
to cause races and terminate a csplit process. mSigShooter can instigate multiple
interrupt signals, but in this case only two instances of SIGINT are needed.
pxz or Parallel XZ [46] is a C utility that uses the LZMA compression algorithm
to compress files using multiple processing cores [47]. The reported race is that an
intermediate file created as part of the compression process can be seen by another
process after creation but just prior to applying the correct permission setting. To
reproduce this race we created stealer, a customized shell script that exploits the
vulnerability (which involves a race between pxz and stealer) by attempting to
steal the information pxz is working on.
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logrotate [48] is an administration tool used to manage the log files from a
system. It rotates, compresses, and mails those system logs based on the configuration,
which can be handled daily, weekly, monthly, or manually. The race occurs after a
log file has been created but before the access mode (chmod) can be set. This small
window allows other applications to see the content of the log file. This is a priority
escalation problem.
ps is a common Linux command that produces a snapshot of the current process
or the current status of processes running on an operating system. grep_script is
a shell script that executes the grep command, which is a GNU search tool, allowing
a user to search each line of input data for specific string patterns (e.g., keywords).
This particular race occurs when the user calls ps on the command line and sends
the result via a pipe to grep to find a specific word [49] (e.g., ps auxw | grep foo).
The output of this command should be a list of existing processes that contain foo
in their names. In theory, when ps runs, it should not see grep since it should not
be running until the data is sent through the pipe for grep to process. However, the
command-line interface creates a pipe, then executes both ps and grep. Running
grep too early is the reason ps can see it and list it along with the other processes.
3.2.2 Over-constrained Process Interaction Faults
Mars Pathfinder [12] is a recreation of a priority inversion event that occurred
on the Mars Pathfinder in 1997. When a high priority process tries to access the
information bus while a low priority process is using it, the lock used to protect the
bus prevents the high priority process from accessing it. However, if a mid priority
process wants to execute, it would then preempt the low priority process while still
holding the lock on the information bus. This can cause a long wait time for the
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high priority process. If this wait time becomes too long, the system will reboot as it
suspects something is wrong with the high-priority task. We classify this as a QoE
problem due to the long delay due to lock contention.
mixxx 1.8.0 [50] is a C++ open source DJ sound mixer software application. Its
design is based on the object-oriented programming paradigm. Each component works
simultaneously and users can interact with the application even while it performs
mixing tasks. The application can process various types of media file formats including
compressed files, and handles data stored directly on local storage or streamed over
the network. Based on its design, the application’s components often share both input
and output resources that can lead to concurrency faults. From the bug report [50],
Mixxx can intermittently freeze, have audio glitches, or become silent while loading
a new media file (FLAC).
The Glibc library has been reported to cause multiple processes or threads to
deadlock. To reproduce this fault, we created a multithreaded program using the library
from Glibc 2.17, which has at least four instances of reported deadlocks [51, 52, 53, 54].
For example, a report indicated that two threads sharing two mutex variables can
deadlock on each other [51]. So we created a program that has two threads sharing
two mutex variables.
Next we describe the two proposed systems, RCRF and RDSC, that have been
designed to reproduce process-level races and atomicity violations. The empirical
evaluations of these two systems are conducted using all pairs of applications or a
subset of these pairs.
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Chapter 4
RCRF: A Reproduction Framework
for Use in Debugging Races,
Deadlocks, and Excessive
Synchronization Delays
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present RCRF, a reproduction framework for use in debugging
races, deadlocks, and excessive synchronization delays, an automated framework that
helps software engineers automatically reproduce reported synchronization-related
faults.1 RCRF performs a hybrid analysis by leveraging existing static program
analysis tools and kernel event reporting tools including STrace [56], DTrace [57],
iNotify [58], and Scribe [59]. These tools provide the observability needed to identify
1This chapter describes work published in the paper “RRF: A Race Reproduction Framework for
Use in Debugging Process-Level Races” [55].
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explicit and implicit accesses to shared resources and automatically map them to
application events. To reproduce a fault that occurs due to synchronization problems
among multiple processes, RCRF executes the instrumented processes and observes
the runtime behaviors of all pair-wise accesses of shared resources. RCRF also provides
a repository in which engineers can store specified correctness properties that can
be used to validate whether a pair of resource access operations experience races or
contention and locate where they occur in the programs.
We conducted an empirical study to evaluate RCRF. We used 20 systems described
in Chapter 3 and applied RCRF to reproduce the faults in those softwares. We studied
whether our framework can reproduce the reported symptoms better than a baseline
approach involving stress testing, and found that our approach was both more efficient
and more effective.
Next we highlight related approaches that are used as part of our framework. We
then introduce RCRF, our proposed framework to debug races, deadlocks, and QoE
faults. Next, we describe the methodology used in our empirical study and report the
results of our empirical evaluation and discuss the results and implications of these
results on debugging practices. We then highlight work related to ours, and conclude.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Motivation
Faults related to process-level concurrency control are caused by incorrectly constrained
process interactions. Over-constraining leads to deadlock or serious synchronization
contention, while under-constraining leads to the various race conditions, broadly
referred to as data-races, atomicity violations, and order violations. In this work, the
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over-constraining concurrency bugs we focus on involve order violations and deadlocks
and the under-constraining concurrency bugs we focus on involve synchronization
contention that can lead to QoE faults. Note that we previously defined these terms
in Chapter 2.
It is worth noting that while races, deadlocks, and contention all occur due to
attempts by multiple processes to simultaneously access a shared resource, they each
exhibit different symptoms. Because contention involves incorrect synchronization, it
is possible to extend a race detector to detect it. The design of RCRF is based on
this observation.
Next, we provide examples to illustrate how races, deadlocks, and contention occur
and why they are difficult to debug. The first issue that makes debugging process-level
races and contention difficult is the lack of execution observability. Because system-
level events including system calls and signals are typically treated as black boxes by
engineers, the sequences of events that occur inside system-level events are not seen.
As an example of a race, in the Linux kernel there was a change in the implementation
of the mv command. Previously, to accomplish its task, mv used a combination of
unlink and rename calls. The new implementation, however, just uses rename.
As such, a previously working shell script that attempts to replace a file using the
sequence of commands rm, ln, and mv no longer works correctly. In this example,
engineers must be able to observe events occurring inside the target of a system call.
Existing instrumentation tools that work at the statement level miss this particular
race because they cannot detect implicit system calls.
The second issue that renders debugging difficult is lack of execution controllability.
Typically, shared resources can be accessed at multiple locations in a pair of faulty
programs. For example, there is a scenario in which two instances of bash shells can
race, resulting in a corrupted history file. In the bash code, there are at least eight
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locations that access the history file. These locations can potentially cause races when
two instances of bash are running simultaneously and they must be exercised in a
pair-wise fashion to reproduce the race. We executed these two instances of bash
over 50,000 times, and were not able to reproduce the reported race. Clearly, an
approach is needed that provides the controllability necessary to exercise interleavings
to reproduce such races, and this approach must be capable of addressing situations
in which multiple locations are involved in causing races.
As an example of a QoE fault, we report a symptom experienced by users of
Mixxx [50] introduced in chapter 2. Users report that Mixxx can momentarily freeze
while playing a song while another media file is loaded by the second player. This
problem has to do with shared buffer management as the buffer can be overun when
multiple players are used. Other reported QoE faults include another media player
called Rhythmbox, which stops playing when performing some other actions [60].
We have also seen reports of modem managers and network managers that can cause
delays in shutting down systems [61], reports of user interfaces crashing [62], and
reports of servers refusing services [63].
4.2.2 Achieving Observability and Controllability
RCRF is motivated by RacePro—a process-level race detection technique—together
with the idea of active testing. In terms of capability, RCRF can also detect and
reproduce deadlocks and synchronization contention. We briefly introduce these two
related techniques below.
RacePro is an approach for reproducing races by using in-vivo execution [3].
RacePro uses a tool, Scribe, to record system-level event traces, and thus provide
observability. These event traces can be used to model system calls and identify
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system-level shared resources (SRs). Specifically, RacePro tracks system calls that
operate on shared resources (e.g., open, read, write, lstat, clone, wait, execve,
and exit); these involve reads and writes on SRs. For example, the lstat system
call on file f reads the metadata of f , and the write system call on f writes to both
the data and metadata of f .
RacePro next analyzes systems for execution branches that can potentially lead
to races, and reorders system-level events in these branches to expand the possible
interleavings beyond those in the recorded trace. These reordered traces are then
run on an in-vivo execution engine, thus achieving controllability. This approach has
benefits: traces can be executed at near zero overhead, and access to source code is
not required. The approach suffers, however, from two problems. First, reordering
system calls can lead to replay divergence, causing the engine to produce an incorrect
report or fail to execute. Second, the in-vivo execution engine is complex and as of
this writing, is no longer being maintained. As such, it is difficult to transfer the
approach to real-world usage (we discuss this further in Section 4.5.2).
Another approach for inducing races to occur is active testing. In this approach,
two steps are commonly performed. First, static or dynamic analysis is used to identify
code locations at which races can occur. Second, functions such as yield are used to
suspend threads around code locations that may cause races. The approach attempts
to expose races by pausing one thread’s execution and then checking to see whether
a race actually occurs. CalFuzzer [64] implements active testing for Java to detect
races occurring in shared memory, and UPC-Thrille [65] implements it for Unified
Parallel C. Active testing is slower than RacePro due to its need to pause threads,
but it does not suffer from replay divergence as it does not explicitly reorder events.
SimRacer [66] is another approach based on active testing; it exercises interleav-
ings to detect races and deadlocks by using a virtual platform to pause and resume
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binary execution. One difference between these testing approaches and RCRF is that
RCRF is not a race and/or deadlock detection system; rather, it is a reproduction
system designed to help engineers reproduce (and ultimately debug) reported races,
deadlocks, and QoE faults. As such, RCRF need not consider all possible locations at
which these faults can occur; instead, it focuses only on accesses to shared resources
that have been reported to experience faults. This allows RCRF to filter out unimpor-
tant shared resources. Testing approaches, on the other hand, consider all potential
sources in order to expose more faults.
4.3 Introducing RCRF
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of RCRF. The input to RCRF includes application
configuration information such as the necessary environment variables, kernel version,
and specific required libraries. We also need to include two or more programs under-
going debugging (PuDs), test inputs, bug reports, and failed output. When program
inputs are provided (which is typically the case in many bug reports), RCRF can
use these to exercise the program. If inputs are not provided, test case generation
techniques can be used to generate inputs. The effectiveness of RCRF does depend,
however, on the quality of the test inputs used.
As an example, we consider a particular bug report related to CSPLIT, a GNU
Core Utils application. In this example, our enviroment information includes the
relevant version of CoreUtils, which is 5.2.0 in this case. We also need to have the
corresponding Linux kernel that supports that particular version of Core Utils, which
is Gentoo 2.6.35. We also need to specify the event monitoring tool. In this case,
Scribe can run on this kernel version so it was used. Next, we need to include two
PuDs. In this particular example, only CSPLIT is specified in the bug report but
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Figure 4.1: Workflow in RCRF
the reported symptom indicates that a race can occur when a signal, SIGINT, is sent.
As such, we developed a program called MSIGSHOOTER that periodically sends
SIGINT to CSPLIT.
Based on the reported symptom, the shared resource is a temporary file that should
be removed after CSPLIT completes, but a race can cause it to not be removed. We
ran the program and monitored the system events related to file deletion (with Scribe
on) and analyzed CSPLIT to map the relevant system events to source code, and
then injected delays. Next, we developed an internal oracle that observes when a
signal is interfering with an access to the shared file. Finally, we ran the modified
PuDs (CSPLIT and MSIGSHOOTER in this case) to exercise all potentially faulty
interleavings; each run exercised only a pair of interleavings. We then used the oracle
to determine whether the reported fault occurs. The oracle result was written into
the report file. Next we describe each component of the approach in greater detail.
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In Component A in Figure 4.1, inputs are used to configure and run each PuD
individually. As a reproduction (not detection) framework, RCRF needs bug reports
that describe the fault that must be reproduced. An engineer then specifies resources
that should be observed. In some cases, bug descriptions clearly specify the resources
that need to be observed; in others, engineer expertise is needed to narrow down
resources to be observed. The foregoing is true, however, of all concurrency fault
reproduction approaches, so we are requiring nothing beyond those.
Unlike manual approaches, however, RCRF then automatically performs analysis
to identify code sections that can access the resources, and injects yield points to
amplify the likelihood of reproducing those targeted faults. In this respect, RCRF is
systematic, extensible, and general. Developers can perform instrumentation either at
the source code level or by using other techniques or tools (e.g., PIN [67]) to perform
instrumentation at the binary code level.
The output after each execution of the PuD is a log of system-level events invoked
during the execution. Each event log is analyzed concurrently with the bug report to
identify resources that can potentially race, deadlock, or be sources of contention by
processes and system-level events that access them. The analysis result is then used
to cull out events that cannot access the resources. The output of this phase is a log
of events for each application that may be relevant to the reported faults.
In Component B, the outputs of the prior phase are mapped to the original source
code. The result of this task is a list of potential interleaving event pairs between the
two applications that can cause reported faults based on previously identified shared
resources. In Component C, delay points are injected into the source code for each
of the potential interleaving event pairs to amplify the chance of exposing reported
faults. To reproduce faults, Component D compiles and executes the two modified
PuDs (mPuDs – the original PuDs with sleep calls injected). As part of execution,
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a system-level event log is generated, containing interaction information about the
PuDs. Since RCRF injects sleep calls at the pair-wise level for each execution, a
difference between the normal execution and the instrumented execution is likely to
be caused by the faulty interleaving induced by the pair of events. This can help
developers pinpoint the problematic pair leading to the failure.
Last, Component E uses interaction information to determine whether a fault
has occurred by validating the output for correctness and analyzing the event logs
against internal property-based oracles (i.e., race, deadlock, contention detectors). An
execution report that includes information on whether targeted faults (e.g., race or
contention) occur and the locations of event pairs that are involved in them is then
generated. As such, we classify RCRF as mostly automatic.
As noted in Section 4.2, RCRF combines part of RacePro with active testing.
Specifically, we leverage Scribe, a system-level event monitoring and logging tool,
to provide observability. Scribe has been used to detect process races in deployed
systems by logging system-level events in Linux; these can be processed off-line to
detect races and other types of concurrency faults [59]. Performance evaluations of
Scribe in server and desktop environments have shown that its average overheads
are 2.5% and 15%, respectively [68]. We use Scribe to detect events due to its
support for Linux and its low runtime overhead. We also show in this chapter that
our framework is generalizable and flexible. We can employ the framework under
different operating environments. For example, we can reproduce faults by running
applications on RT-Linux operating system and use STrace to record the kernel
events. We can then apply different oracles to detect faults.,
Like active testing, we use process yielding to provide the controllability needed to
reproduce process-level races. We inject sleep calls at specific code locations in the
two programs to enforce a desired interleaving. RCRF is systematic in the approaches
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[39] ioctl(0, 5401, 0xbfe59d68) = 0 
[39]     data: output, ptr = 0xbfe59d68, size = 36, 00000500 00000005 000000bf 00008a3b ... 
[39] fstatat64(-100, 0x8059b1c, 0x8059abc, 256) = 0 
[39]     data: input string, ptr = 0x8059b1c, size = 23, "/usr/local/var/locatedb" 
[39]     resource lock, type = inode, access = read, id = 1, serial = 0, desc = none 
[39]     resource lock, type = inode, access = read, id = 29, serial = 0, desc = none 
[39]     resource lock, type = inode, access = read, id = 44, serial = 0, desc = none 
[39]     resource lock, type = inode, access = read, id = 261, serial = 5, desc = none 
[39]     resource lock, type = inode, access = read, id = 446, serial = 0, desc = none 
[39]     data: non-det output, ptr = 0x8059abc, size = 96, 00000803 00000000 00000000 ... 
[39] unlinkat(-100, 0x80588c0, 0) = 0 
[39]     data: input string, ptr = 0x80588c0, size = 23, "/usr/local/var/locatedb" 
[39]     resource lock, type = inode, access = read, id = 1, serial = 0, desc = none 
[39]     resource lock, type = inode, access = read, id = 29, serial = 0, desc = none 
[39]     resource lock, type = inode, access = read, id = 44, serial = 0, desc = none 
[39]     resource lock, type = inode, access = write, id = 261, serial = 9, desc = none 
[39] llseek(0, 0, 0, 0xbfe59d10, 1) = -29 ESPIPE (Illegal seek) 
[39]     resource lock, type = files_struct, access = read, id = 441, serial = 14, desc = none 
[39]     resource lock, type = file, access = write, id = 262, serial = 1, desc = /dev/pts/0 
[39] close(0) = 0 
[39]     resource lock, type = files_struct, access = write, id = 441, serial = 15, desc = none 
Figure 4.2: Sample Scribe output
it uses to identify relevant system-level events, map those events to application events,
generate execution interleavings that should be explored, and validate whether a
reported race has been reproduced. RCRF is largely automated so it can be more
precise than manual approaches for generating interleavings. It is also extensible
so that engineers can specify new oracles for use in detecting races, deadlocks, and
contention. It can also identify interacting events that cause those faults. Next, we
describe the components of RCRF.
4.3.1 Identifying Relevant System Events
For RCRF to work, Component A requires inputs, including a bug report, a pair
of PuDs, and a configuration file. First, engineers must analyze the bug report
to ascertain information relevant to revealing shared resources on which targeted
faults can possibly occur. Some bug reports provide comprehensive information (e.g.,
inputs or execution scripts, operating environments, other running applications, and
behavioral descriptions of detected faults [37, 39,40,45,46]); in these cases engineers
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can use the information to generate specific traces of system-level events (e.g., use
the execution scripts provided). Some reports, however, are less comprehensive (e.g.,
providing no inputs and providing only vague behavioral descriptions of the detected
faults [36, 38]); in these cases engineers need to perform additional tasks, including
additional test input generation and shared resource analysis, to increase the chance
of exercising code sections that can potentially cause the reported faults. These
activities are common to other approaches for reproducing concurrency faults, so by
requiring them ourselves we are requiring nothing extra. At a minimum, we expect
information regarding the incorrect symptoms experienced by users of the system
(e.g., file corruption, missing signals, and socket not found errors) to be provided as
part of the bug report. In some cases, a user may provide an execution script as
part of a bug report that may help engineers reproduce the race [3]. In other cases,
users may provide only the symptoms. In the latter case, engineers need to identify
potential interleavings that might expose the reported races based on the symptom (as
illustrated in the CSPLIT example). Our framework is capable of efficiently helping
engineers accomplish this goal.
To further illustrate the process for identifying resources that can potentially race we
provide another example, involving two applications. Suppose that process updatedb
can race with process locate, but the bug report for this race describes only what can
happen without providing execution scenarios in which the race occurs. Based on the
reported symptom, which is a corrupted database file located at /usr/local/var/locatedb,
an engineer could individually run the two PuDs using an existing test suite while
turning on an event reporting tool such as Scribe. At the end of each run, a report
of a list of system-level events is generated. For example, Figure 4.2 provides an
example of Scribe output, that shows system-level events initiated by updatedb.
The associated command snippet is shown in Figure 4.3.
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141 # To avoid breaking locate while this script is running, put the 
142 # results in a temp file, then rename it atomically. 
143 if test -s $LOCATE_DB.n; then 
144   rm -f $LOCATE_DB 
145   mv $LOCATE_DB.n $LOCATE_DB 
146   chmod 644 $LOCATE_DB 
147 else 
148   echo "updatedb: new database would be empty" >&2 
149   rm -f $LOCATE_DB.n 
150 fi 
Figure 4.3: Mapping a block of system calls to a line of source code in updatedb
In most cases, traces generated by tools like Scribe or STrace contain extraneous
information that includes other system-level events not relevant to a reported symptom.
To cull out extraneous information, we rely on the analysis of the bug report. In our
first example, the bug report indicates that process-level races occur on a particular
database file; thus, only events that can manipulate that file are considered relevant. In
the case in which a symbolic link is also made to the database file, Scribe also reports
the actual file name as well as the symbolic name so we can still accurately remove
extraneous information. In our example, the highlighted system calls in Figure 4.2
(fstatat64 and unlinkat) are relevant to the reported race because they access the
database file; remaining system calls in the figure are not relevant.
Even when an execution script is provided as part of a bug report, the foregoing
process should be applied to find possible faulty locations that may exist in the path
where the reported fault exists. This is because RCRF can determine whether there
are other code locations that can produce damaging faults instead of focusing only on
the reported interleaving. As shown in Section 4.5, we have found examples in which
a reported fault can have multiple sources within two programs. If engineers focus on
a single source, they may leave other sources that result in similar faults untouched.
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4.3.2 Mapping System-level Events to Source Code
Component A of RCRF produces a list of relevant system-level events for each
application. These events must be mapped to the source code locations in the
application that invoke their corresponding system calls. Component B constructs this
mapping by combining static analysis and system-level event modeling (discussed in
Section 4.2). (Note that we intend RCRF to be used by engineers who are debugging
applications developed by their own organizations, so it is reasonable to assume the
availability of source code.)
RCRF performs static analysis at the source code level to identify source code
locations involving application events (e.g., using rm to remove the database file) and
then translates each event into a sequence of system calls based on the previously
constructed models. The result is a mapping of each block of system level events (e.g.,
system calls to write to a file and manipulate the corresponding inode structure) to
the corresponding event in the source code of the PuD. Figure 4.3 illustrates how the
highlighted block of system calls in Figure 4.2 is mapped to line 144 of updatedb.
We can perform this mapping because we have already modeled the rm operation to
include a sequence of two system calls, fstatat64 and unlinkat. The output of this
component is a list of locations where a fault may be initiated.
4.3.3 PuD Modification
Given a set of locations in two PuDs that can potentially race, interleavings must be
enforced at these locations. This is done by using sleep calls to pause the execution
of one process at a particular shared resource access point and then pause the other
process at an execution point that accesses the same resource. Currently, we inject
sleep calls into source code, but binary instrumentation could also be used. To
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identify pause points, Component C performs pairwise analysis of relevant application
events between the two processes. While a more optimized pairwise algorithm can
be applied in the case of large numbers of events [36, 37, 38, 40, 46], by culling out
extraneous events the number of system calls utilized can be rendered small enough
to employ all combinations.
To perform pair-wise injection, the list of system calls Si from process Pi and the
list of system calls Sj from process Pj are used as inputs. System calls in Si and Sj
are paired if they access the same shared resource. σ stores a list of such pairs (σi,
σj), which is initialized to empty. Since the order of the two system calls in a pair
matters, we choose to include (σi, σj) and (σj, σi) in σ. The results of this process
are instrumented PuDs with sleep calls (mPuDs).
Because our implementation uses sleep calls, our framework needs to use an
appropriate sleep time for each injected sleep call. To select an initial sleep time, we
consider the amount of time necessary for the critical operation to be completed. We
then refine this initial time through trial runs to determine an optimal sleep time for
each case. In the cases we studied, we found that one second worked well in all cases.
RCRF also needs to ensure that we can execute pairs of processes in specific orders.
For example, we may want to ensure that a suspected system call in one process is
executed before another suspected system call in another process. In this scenario, we
set the sleep time of the second process to be longer than that of the first.
RCRF also injects sleep calls before and after each suspected system call to
maximize the likelihood of exposing targeted faults. In this scenario, we would explore
the execution interleaving that configures Pi to execute before Pj and then explore
the interleaving that configures Pj to execute before Pi. As such, two sleep calls
(with one and two seconds of sleep time, respectively) would be injected immediately
before a system call and another pair of sleep calls would be injected immediately
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Algorithm 1 Sleep Injection
Require: a list of suspected SysCalls from Pi (Si),
a list of suspected SysCalls from Pj (Sj),
source code of Pi (SRCi),
source code of Pj (SRCj),
two targeted system calls from the Pairwise Algorithm (σ), sleep time (ST )
1: MP ← ∅
2: for all (σi, σj) ∈ σ do
3: { places to inject sleep before system calls }
4: Lib = ∅
5: Ljb = ∅
6: { places to inject sleep after system calls }
7: Lia = ∅
8: Lja = ∅
9: if (σi ∈ Si) then
10: Lib = sleep(ST ) + σi
11: Ljb = sleep(2× ST ) + σi
12: Lia = sleep(ST ) + σi
13: Lja = σi + sleep(2× ST )
14: else
15: Lib = sleep(2× ST ) + σj
16: Ljb = sleep(ST ) +σj
17: Lia = σj + sleep(2× ST )
18: Lja = sleep(ST ) +σj
19: end if
20: MP ←GenModPuD(Si, Sj,SRCi, SRCj,Lib , Ljb , Lia , Lja)
21: { one sleep is injected before a system call; the other after the system call }
22: end for
23: return a set of mPuDs MP
after the system call. Conditional compilation is used to specify the desired execution
interleaving (e.g., Pj executes before Pi).
Algorithm 1 presents our sleep call injection approach. For each pair of system
calls σ (Line 2), the algorithm creates four mPuDs MP (Line 17). It first determines
which process to execute first, by comparing the specified system call (σi) to system
calls in Pi (Si). If found, Pj needs to execute first and thus uses ST as the sleep time
(Line 8) and Pj uses 2 × ST as its sleep time (Line 13). If σi is not found in Si, it
38
is in Pj; therefore, Pj needs to execute before Pi (Lines 9 and 14). This information
is used to inject sleep calls into the source files of Pi and Pj, which are SRCi and
SRCj, respectively. Lines 10-11 and 15-16 specify locations at which to inject the
sleep calls after σi and σj. The algorithm returns the mPuDs with injected sleep
calls. If there are multiple sources of potential faults, the same mPuDs are used and
conditional compilation flags are used to enable a particular sleep call. Figure 4.4
illustrates a modified updatedb.
4.3.4 Fault Reproduction
Next, the mPuDs must be executed to attempt to reproduce the reported symptoms.
To do this, RCRF compiles each mPuD and runs them in pair-wise fashion as specified
in σ. Observerability tools such as Scribe or DTrace record relevant OS activities
that can be used by oracles (described next) to detect whether reported faults occur
and determine the causes of these faults. It is possible that even with amplification by
sleep calls, our approach can suffer from execution non-determinism because a system
call is a large block of execution steps and thus, execution interleavings between two
system calls have variability. To address this we ran trials using different numbers of
runs and found that we could reliably reproduce targeted faults within 10 runs.
4.3.5 Fault Validation
An important component of our framework is an oracle that can be used to observe
whether a reported fault occurs in each run. Because our targeted faults (i.e., races,
deadlocks, and synchronization delays) are dynamic in nature, we employ both internal
oracles [69] and output based oracles to help detect whether a targeted fault occurs
and isolate the locations of its causes. The information generated by our oracles is
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if test -s $LOCATE_DB.n; then 
 
#ifdef L10 
  sleep 1 
#endif 
. 
. 
#ifdef L27 
  sleep 1 
#endif 
 
  rm -f $LOCATE_DB 
 
#ifdef L110 
  sleep 2 
#endif 
. 
. 
Figure 4.4: A modified updatedb source file with injected sleep calls
then used to further classify each detected fault into three possible types: targeted,
incidental, and new. If a run is intended to exercise a particular fault (e.g., a race
or a synchronization delay based on where we inject sleep calls into the two PuDs)
described in a bug report, and that same race is detected, it is classified as targeted.
If a fault is detected but it is not due to our sleep calls, it is either an incidental
fault or a new fault. An incidental fault is a detected fault that we did not intend
to exercise in a given run but would attempt to exercise later through a different set
of sleep calls; however, it naturally occurs as part of the run. A new fault is a fault
that is not related to the possible locations, determined by our analysis, at which a
reported fault can occur.
We designed our internal oracles to look for property violations such as TOCTOU
(time of check to time of use) violations, atomicity violations, deadlocks, excessive
delays and races. Internal oracles can be implemented using various existing race and
deadlock detection techniques that include vector clock [35], lockset [19], happen-before
relationships [70], and linear temporal logic [71]. In the case of QoE faults, we also
need to develop monitors to automatically detect symptoms such as long execution
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delays and intermittent pauses. Our oracles and monitors are stored in an expandable
repository so that engineers can extend our framework to detect types of faults beyond
those covered in this work. At the end of the RCRF process, a report is generated to
specify whether faults occur, classify their types, and provide their locations in the
two PuDs. This information can help engineers localize faults.
In terms of execution complexity, there are three factors that can determine the
number of runs that should be used to try to reproduce faults. The first factor is the
number of system calls in the two applications that must be executed in pairwise fashion
(Si and Sj). In our example, locate and updatedb have three relevant system calls
each. As such, the number of pairs (interleavings) is 3× 3. The second factor is the
number of patterns that we want to explore for each interleaving. Currently, we have
four patterns: Pi before Pj before the system call, Pj before Pi before the system call,
Pi before the system call and Pj after the system call, and Pj before the system call
and Pi after the system call. As such, we need to multiply each interleaving by four.
The third factor is the number of runs that we need to overcome non-determinism
(r). As such, the number of runs we need to reproduce a reported fault between two
applications is sizeof(Si)× sizeof(Sj)× 4r.
4.4 Empirical Study
RCRF provides an automated process for reproducing specific classes of faults due to
under- and over-constrained process interactions. Ultimately we are concerned with
whether engineers who use RCRF can localize and correct these types of faults more
quickly than with current approaches. Studies of humans, however, are expensive, and
before embarking on these it makes sense to study whether the approach can indeed
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reproduce targeted faults reliably, and in a reasonable amount of time. We therefore
designed an empirical study considering the following two research questions:
RQ1: Given faults that fall within the classes of faults RCRF targets, how effective
is RCRF at reproducing these?
RQ2: Given faults that fall within the classes of faults RCRF targets, how costly is
it to run RCRF on these?
4.4.1 Objects of Analysis
To answer our research questions we needed to locate instances of systems in which
faults had been reported, that are within the scope of the classes of faults RCRF is
designed to target. To do so, we used the applications described in Chapter 3 as our
objects of analysis. We use all 20 pairs of apps in the evaluation of RCRF.
4.4.2 Variables and Measures
Independent Variable. We wish to assess the effectiveness and cost of RCRF. To
assess effectiveness (RQ1), we wished to compare RCRF to a baseline technique,
and an initial candidate for this was RacePro. However, we discovered that there
are several limitations of RacePro that prevent it from running on many of our
object program pairs. For example, it does not handle deadlocks and delays due to
contention. We also experienced many instances of replay divergence when we used it
to detect and replay races. This rendered it unsuitable for use as a baseline technique.
We provide further discussion of the limitations we encountered, along with the data
we were able to obtain, in Section 4.5.2.
As an alternative baseline technique for use in this study, we compare RCRF to
a stress-testing approach typical of those commonly used in practice to detect these
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types of faults. The stress-testing approach (STA) that we utilize tries to reproduce
reported faults by randomly launching the pairs of programs that are known to have
faults a large number of times. Note that this is a simple process that operates
primarily based on the known symptoms. Our proposed approach is similar to this
approach in that it is also driven by the reported symptoms but without needing to
employ complex processes of recording events and then replaying them.
We evaluate STA and RCRF with the RCRF observation tool turned on in order to
gather execution information that would be needed by engineers to begin to understand
the causes of a reported fault, if it occurs. We also use the same oracle in both cases.
To provide a fair comparison of the approaches, for each pair of object programs,
we first executed RCRF on the pair to completion, measuring the amount of time
required. We then executed the STA approach for exactly that amount of time. This
lets us assess the relative effectiveness of the approaches when they are given the same
amounts of time.
Dependent Variables. To assess effectiveness (RQ1), we measure the number
of test runs needed by RCRF and STA to detect each targeted fault, in the cases in
which the fault was revealed. To assess the cost of RCRF (RQ2), we measure the
wall clock time required for a complete run of the approach. In this case, there is no
baseline approach to compare RCRF against.
4.4.3 Study Methodology
To automate RCRF we minimized the involvement of the user by encoding all
information necessary for a run into a configuration file. This information includes
the project name, shared resource name, first process number, second process number,
location of the source code for the first and second processes, and log files. When
43
RCRF begins, the full list of system calls is filtered to exclude system calls from
processes not being targeted. Then, a second filter returns just the system calls that
use the shared resources. After RCRF cleans up the log, it generates mPuDs by
pairing up the system calls. By calculating and injecting sleep calls into the source
code (before or after) that map to the system calls, each mPuD can represent a set of
interleaving patterns. RCRF then executes the pair of mPuDs, and passes the output
of each through the validation component to determine whether the targeted fault
has occurred. We repeat the foregoing process ten times for each case, because even
when using forced interleavings, non-determinism can still occur.
4.4.4 Threats to Validity
The primary threat to external validity in this study involves the object programs
utilized. We have studied just 20 pairs of faulty programs. However, the programs
are real and the faults are real and non-trivial to reproduce. A second threat involves
the representativeness of our oracles. These threats can be addressed only through
further studies.
The primary threat to internal validity involves potential errors in the implemen-
tations of RCRF and the infrastructure used to run RCRF and STA. To limit these
we extensively validated all of our tool components and scripts.
The primary threat to construct validity relates to the fact that we study effec-
tiveness and cost measures relative to applications of RCRF, but do not yet assess
whether the approach helps engineers localize and correct targeted faults more quickly
than current approaches. A second threat involves the dynamic and non-deterministic
nature of the fault classes we are targeting. When we inject sleep calls into the two
PuDs and run the programs, the goal is to exercise a fault that can occur around those
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two sleep calls. However, other faults can also naturally occur during that run, so
the data we use to answer RQ1 must distinguish between faults we intend to exercise
(targeted faults) and faults that unexpectedly occur outside of the injected sleep
calls (incidental faults). We address this threat by analyzing the reported results to
classify every detected fault into the three types previously introduced in Section 4.3:
targeted, incidental, and new. This classification allows us to measure the effectiveness
of RCRF more precisely.
4.4.5 Results
Table 4.1 provides data for both of our research questions. Column C indicates the
total execution time required by RCRF in minutes. Columns D and G show the
total numbers of runs for RCRF and STA, respectively. Columns E and H show the
total numbers of runs in which races were detected for RCRF and STA, respectively.
Columns F and I show the percentages of runs in which races were detected relative
to runs in which they were not, for RCRF and STA, respectively. The first 17 rows
represent pairs of programs that can suffer from various forms of targeted process-level
races. The last three rows represent pairs of programs that suffer from QoE faults
and deadlocks.
We turn first to RQ1, considering the comparative effectiveness of RCRF and STA
for all pairs. Recall that the two techniques were executed for the same amounts of
time (the amount of time required by RCRF). In that amount of time, STA conducted
between 1.29 times (mixxx-mixxx) and 35.84 times (ps-grep) more runs than those
of RCRF. (Because we utilized monitoring on both approaches, the differences in
numbers of runs are due to the fact that RCRF injects sleep calls, whereas STA does
not.) Nevertheless, these additional runs did not allow STA to outperform RCRF. In
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Table 4.1: Empirical Results
Total RCRF STA
PuD1
(A)
PuD2
(B)
Time
(Minutes)
(C)
Total
Runs
(D)
Revealed
Faults
(E)
%
(F)
Total
Runs
(G)
Revealed
Faults
(H)
%
(I)
updatedb updatedb 18 360 110 30.55 938 68 7.24
locate updatedb 13 360 20 5.55 1,286 0 0
bash bash 613 7,840 1,308 16.68 56,570 0 0
mv rm 40 640 60 9.37 4,595 0 0
rm(fts) symlink 11 240 7 2.91 2,717 0 0
mkdir cleaner 1.56 40 10 25 424 1 0.25
mknod cleaner 1.82 40 11 27.5 90 0 0
mkfifo cleaner 1.6 40 12 25 429 0 0
mkdir2 cleaner 1.62 40 10 25 440 1 0.22
mknod2 cleaner 1.62 40 12 30 334 0 0
mkfifo2 cleaner 1.67 40 10 25 346 3 0.86
ln cleaner 7.98 240 40 16.67 3,786 0 0
find cleaner2 5.6 160 30 18.75 283 0 0
csplit msigshooter 11 160 60 37.5 2,502 0 0
pxz stealer 20 320 20 6.25 613 0 0
logrotate stealer2 110.36 3,080 336 10 33,558 0 0
ps grep_script 60.16 80 18 22.5 2,867 797 27.79
mars_high mars_low 11.81 160 24 15 326 0 0
mixxx mixxx 2,154.16 550 347 63.09 709 393 55
multithread multithread 164.98 660 111 16.68 2,466 0 0
fact, STA was unable to reproduce reported races at all on 14 of the 20 application
pairs; RCRF, in contrast, was able to reproduce reported faults on all 20 pairs. For
updatedb-updatedb, mkdir-cleaner, mkdir2-cleaner and mkfifo2-cleaner,
STA was able to reproduce reported races, but the numbers and percentages of runs
in which it did so were smaller than those in which RCRF succeeded. However, for
ps-grep, STA caught the race on 27.79 percent of all runs while RCRF caught it on
only 22.5 percent of all runs. These percentages seem close, but the number of total
runs are much different across the techniques: RCRF employs only 80 runs whereas
STA employs 2,867 runs.
Note that it is generally true that the number of runs exercised by STA is greater
than that of RCRF. In most cases, all runs can complete successfully. One exception
is in the case of mixxx-mixxx, which is the most complex application among our
pairs of applications. We identified 100 interleavings that can potentially result in
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the reported fault. Based on our methodology, we run mixxx-mixxx 1,000 times (we
ran each of the 100 interleavings 10 times). Out of these 1,000 runs, only 550 of them
were able to complete successfully. The other 450 runs terminated prematurely. Out
of these 550 completed runs, we were able to reproduce 347 faults or 63.09% of the
completed runs were successful in reproducing faults.
Turning to RQ2, in 15 of 20 cases, RCRF required 40 minutes or less to exe-
cute. In four cases (bash-bash), (logrotate-stealer2), (mixxx-mixxx) and
(multithread-multithread), however, it required 613 minutes (over 10 hours),
110.36 minutes (almost 2 hours), 2,154.16 minutes (almost 36 hours), and 164.98
(about 2.74 hours) respectively. Especially for (bash-bash), the execution time of
RCRF is dictated primarily by the number of executions it needs to perform, and
this in turn is dictated by the number of pair-wise interleavings that must be tar-
geted. Table 4.2 (rightmost column) shows the numbers of interleavings required,
and indicates the much larger number needed in the case of bash-bash and others
(Except mixxx-mixxx). Still, 40 minutes of machine time is arguably affordable,
given the difficulty of revealing races and the fact that STA could not do so in this
case. However, in the case of mixxx-mixxx, there are more factors causing QoE faults.
The contention events generated by applying RCRF tend to create longer QoE faults
than those experienced by a normal run without RCRF. This shows the capability of
RCRF to reproduce the reported symptoms due to synchronization delays.
ps-grep is a special pair among the others. With STA, the race between of these
applications on the share resource or pipeline communication channels at the process
level always happens. However, RCRF is able to generate different interleavings and
causes two patterns to avoid the race.
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4.5 Discussion
The results in Column D, E, and F from Table 4.1 show that RCRF was able to
reproduce reported faults on all 20 object program pairs. On the 18 pairs of programs
other than ps-grep_script and mixxx-mixxx, for which both RCRF and STA
both reproduced reported faults, RCRF reproduced the faults more times than STA.
Larger numbers of fault-revealing interleavings may help engineers localize the causes
of faults more efficiently. On most of the other programs, RCRF reproduced faults
that STA, run an equivalent amount of time, could not. We also noticed that for
mixxx-mixxx and PS-GREP_SCRIPT, the numbers of detected faults by STA,
reported in Column H, are higher than the numbers of faults detected by RCRF,
reported in Column E. Further investigation revealed that STA repeatedly detected
the same races. Overall, these results suggest that RCRF is more effective than stress
testing for reproducing difficult cases of process-level races, deadlock, and excessive
delays.
It is also worth noting that RCRF possesses one characteristic that STA does not:
it provides additional information to test engineers that STA cannot, in the form of
execution window amplification. Typically, it is challenging to reproduce concurrency
faults that occur only in very small execution windows. This is why an enormous
number of runs is often needed to expose an instance of an elusive concurrency fault.
By providing a systematic way to amplify execution windows, RCRF should have a
better chance of reproducing such elusive faults than STA.
4.5.1 Additional Analysis
Each PuD that we studied invokes a large number of system-level events during its
execution. Many of these events, however, are not relevant to reported faults. RCRF
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Table 4.2: Optimization of Numbers of System Calls
System Calls Using
Share Resources Pair-wise
Before After Opt. InterPuD1 (A) PuD2 (B)
Opt.
(C)
PuD1
(D)
PuD2
(E)
leaving
(F)
updatedb updatedb 5,232 3 3 36
locate updatedb 2,818 3 3 36
bash bash 8,518 6 8 784
mv rm 391 8 2 64
rm(fts) symlink 1,343 3 1 24
mkdir cleaner 2,848 2 1 4
mknod cleaner 2,871 2 1 4
mkfifo cleaner 2,838 2 1 4
mkdir2 cleaner 2,848 2 1 4
mknod2 cleaner 2,874 2 1 4
mkfifo2 cleaner 2,847 2 1 4
ln cleaner 3,893 2 1 4
find cleaner2 10,820 4 1 16
csplit msigshooter 462 4 1 16
pxz stealer 4,975 5 1 32
logrotate stealer2 30,755 77 1 308
ps grep_script 1,027 2 1 8
mars_high mars_low 246 2 2 16
mixxx mixxx 675,720 7 7 100
multithread multithread 1,027 12 12 66
culls out these extra events, and to see to what extent it succeeds in this, we gathered
data on the numbers of system calls using shared resources before and after this culling.
Table 4.2 presents the results, and shows that culling reduces the number of system
calls to be considered by several orders of magnitude (Columns D and E). This also
reduces the number of interleavings that must be exercised as shown in Column F.
Recall that RCRF calculates the pair-wise interleavings that can access shared
resources in each application. For example, csplit has four possible locations and
mSigshooter has one. As such, in this case RCRF produces four pairs of interleav-
ings. We can also view each pair of interleavings as a potential source of faults. The
third column in Table 4.3 reports the numbers of potential sources of faults observed
in each pair of programs, and the fourth column reports the number of these potential
sources that produced the reported fault. On all 20 of our program pairs, multiple
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Table 4.3: Interleavings That Can Cause Reported Races
PuD1 PuD2 # of PotentialSources of Races
# of Sources
That Failed
updatedb updatedb 9 9
locate updatedb 9 2
bash bash 196 79
mv rm 16 5
rm(fts) symlink 6 1
mkdir cleaner 4 1
mknod cleaner 4 1
mkfifo cleaner 4 1
mkdir2 cleaner 4 1
mknod2 cleaner 4 1
mkfifo2 cleaner 4 1
ln cleaner 24 2
find cleaner2 16 2
csplit msigshooter 4 2
pxz stealer 8 7
logrotate stealer2 308 5
ps grep_script 8 2
mars_high mars_low 16 4
mixxx mixxx 100 54
multithread multithread 66 11
potential sources of faults were identified. On all program pairs, more than one of
these potential sources did in fact produce the reported fault. In practice, if the
engineer debugging the applications does not monitor all sources, it is possible that a
patch may not repair all defective sources. By using RCRF, developers can locate
additional causes of faults.
Table 4.4: Additional Fault Types Found
Number
of FaultsPuD1 PuD2 Additional Fault TypesFound Found
locate updatedb
updatedb delete the
database file while locate
is using that database.
120
updatedb updatedb Only one updatedb canreally update. 204
We also applied different oracles to assess whether other types of concurrency
faults can occur on the same shared resource in an application. To do this, we chose
oracles that operate on similar resources (e.g., files, sockets) and applied those oracles
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to validate the event traces. Table 4.4 reports our findings. In addition to the reported
faults, two pairs of programs also contained other types of faults involving the shared
resources that we monitor. First, updatedb-updatedb can suffer from a second
type of race that leads to a nullified update; we found 204 additional instances of this
type of fault. Second, we also found 120 instances of premature file removal due to
races in locate-updatedb. Validating traces using additional oracles incurred only
modest overhead. For example, using one additional oracle to validate locate and
updatedb adds only 18 more seconds per run.
It is worth noting that the quality of a bug report can affect the effectiveness of
RCRF. If a report is incomplete, RCRF must conservatively identify more relevant
events; this can result in increased debugging time. Vaguely described symptoms can
also lead to imprecise fault localization by requiring RCRF to consider additional
events and resources. Because RCRF is dynamic, the quality of test suites can also
affect its ability to localize concurrency faults; inadequate test suites can lead to fewer
events that can be identified as relevant.
4.5.2 RCRF versus RacePro
According to Laaden et al. [59], RacePro is capable of detecting the types of races
that occur in our object programs, as well as additional race types. To do this, first,
RacePro identifies all potential locations that may lead to a race that needs to be
reproduced. Second, it uses replay to cause races to occur. Based on this information,
we also attempted to compare RCRF to RacePro. Our investigation focuses only
on process-level races. This is because we applied RacePro to detect the other two
types of faults that we target and found that RacePro cannot detect deadlocks or
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excessive delays. Unfortunately, we were only able to run it on 13 of our 17 pairs of
racy programs. For the four that failed, RacePro encountered runtime errors.
One limitation ofRacePro involves its limited ability to perform resource accessing
and anchoring of the sleep calls needed to exercise races. This ultimately results in
many instances of replay divergence. We also discovered several faults in RacePro
that have not been addressed, perhaps because RacePro has not been actively
maintained since 2012. These faults prevented four pairs of programs from running [72,
73]. Even for pairs of programs that we were able to run, we needed to carefully
rewrite them first. For example, we needed to change the programs so that they
created processes in certain orders using specific syntaxes.
Table 4.5: Results from RacePro
Number of Races ReportedPuD1
(A)
PuD2
(B) Detected(C)
Diverged
(D)
Benign
(E)
Harmful
(F)
Faults Found
(G)
updatedb updatedb n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
locate updatedb n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
bash bash 25 15 10 0 Yes
mv rm n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
rm(fts) symlink 19 19 0 0 Yes
mkdir cleaner 4 1 3 0 Yes
mknod cleaner 4 1 3 0 Yes
mkfifo cleaner 3 0 3 0 Yes
mkdir2 cleaner 4 1 3 0 Yes
mknod2 cleaner 3 1 2 0 Yes
mkfifo2 cleaner 3 0 3 0 Yes
ln cleaner 2 0 2 0 Yes
find cleaner2 7 3 4 0 Yes
csplit msigshooter 4 0 4 0 No
pxz stealer n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
logrotate stealer2 15 0 15 0 No
ps grep_script 8 1 7 0 Yes
mars_high mars_low n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
mixxx mixxx n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
multithread multithread n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Table 4.5 provides data on our attempt to run RacePro. As the table shows,
RacePro was able to identify some locations that can potentially cause the known
races; however, not all of these locations could be used to reproduce the race on the
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bug reports, as shown in Column G. For csplit-msigshooter, RacePro tended to
detect races occurring on other shared resources and not the reported races. In this
case, RacePro detected races occurring on the file that both programs try to access.
This happened with logrotate-stealer2 as well.
We also tried to apply RacePro to detect deadlocks and QoE faults. Unfortunately,
RacePro has been designed to detect races but not the other types of faults we
are targeting and it was unable to reproduce any fault in the last three pairs of
applications.
4.5.3 Incidental Faults
In some programs, faults are particularly difficult to reproduce and in these cases,
amplification is necessary to exercise them. In other cases, faults can occur naturally
even without amplification, and such other faults, in addition to the ones we intend
to exercise, can also occur in a program execution. We report the results of our
investigation of incidental faults during our experiments in Table 4.6.
As the table shows, two of our pairs of programs exhibit faulty behaviors more
frequently than others. In these cases, the faults we observed included both targeted
and incidental faults and additional analysis of the data was required to distinguish
them. All of the cases show, however, that RCRF was effective for reproducing the
targeted faults.
4.5.4 Detecting Unreported Faults
We also discovered that in some cases, the repair specified in a bug report [37] does
not completely fix faults. As shown in Table 4.4, in our application pair (locate,
updatedb), the repair described in the report fixes the updatedb script but races
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Table 4.6: Numbers of Targeted Races and Incidental Races
Type of RacesPuD1 PuD2 Targeted Incidental
updatedb updatedb 85 25
locate updatedb 20 0
bash bash 562 746
mv rm 40 0
rm(fts) symlink 7 0
mkdir cleaner 10 0
mknod cleaner 10 1
mkfifo cleaner 10 2
mkdir2 cleaner 10 0
mknod2 cleaner 10 2
mkfifo2 cleaner 10 0
ln cleaner 40 0
find cleaner2 30 0
csplit msigshooter 60 0
pxz staler 20 0
logrotate stealer2 270 66
ps grep_script 2 0
mars_high mars_low 24 0
mixxx mixxx 54 0
multithread multithread 11 1
can still occur in locate. Using RCRF we were still able to reproduce races after
the suggested repair has been applied. We also found another fault in updatedb-
updatedb where a race can cause one update to succeed and the other simultaneous
update to fail.
We also tried to reproduce previously known faults in a subsequent version of
the same library. A bug report [41] indicates that process-level races can occur in
mkdir, mknod, and mkfifo commands from GNU Core Utils 5.2.1. However, a
subsequent bug report [42], indicates only that mkdir2 still suffers from process-level
races. The report does not refer to mknod2 and mkfifo2. Since they are all from
the same version of GNU Core Utils 5.97, we decide to test all of them and we can
still reproduce the same previously reported races in version 5.97.
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4.5.5 Evaluating Repair Effectiveness
So far, we have applied RCRF to reproduce reported faults. However, RCRF can
also be used by developers to observe the effectiveness of a bug fix based on applying
delays to avoid concurrency faults. In ps-grep_script, races are inevitable due
to the way the command-line interface sets up the communication pipe. A possible
fix is to inject a delay prior to launching grep. While this delay injection is done
manually by a developer, we can still apply RCRF to observe (via the use of our
runtime monitoring tool and oracle) whether the solution is effective.
4.6 Work Related to RCRF
There has been a great deal of research on debugging concurrent programs at the thread
level [74,75,76,77,78]. These techniques, however, focus on multi-threaded applications
within single processes, and have rarely been adapted to deal with concurrency faults
occurring across processes.
There are several dynamic techniques that replay or reproduce concurrency faults
by permuting thread interleavings. We have already described active testing tech-
niques including CalFuzzer [64] and UPC-Thrille [65]. CHESS [32] captures
information on nondeterminism during program execution and allows the scheduler
to later reproduce a faulty execution by replaying nondeterministic choices. These
techniques, however, focus on thread-level concurrency while ignoring concurrency
faults at the process level.
There has been much research on fault localization for concurrent programs [27,
79,80,81,82]. For example, Park et al. [27] monitor memory-access patterns among
threads and detect data-access patterns associated with a program’s pass/fail results.
They then use statistical debugging to report data access patterns with suspiciousness
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scores. Wang et al. [83] identify of shared memory access pairs that behave distinctively
in failed and successful runs, and pinpoint root causes using different test procedures.
Again, these techniques focus on thread-level concurrency faults. In addition, they
are applied only during pre-deployment.
There have been a few approaches created for detecting races at the process
level [3, 66,84,85]. We have already discussed RacePro [3]. In addition, detecting
TOCTOU races [85] has been a topic in the security community. TOCTOU races
typically occur when the permission check and use of a file in one process is not
atomic, allowing a malicious process to slip in and attack the file. Our prior work on
SimRacer leverages active testing [17] to reduce false positives during dynamic race
detection. However, these techniques all focus on testing and detection and do not
consider the debugging of process-level concurrency faults.
There have been several approaches to detect synchronization contention [86,87,88].
There are also prior studies on contention reproduction and optimization [89,90,91,92].
Work by Carril and Tichy [89] targets C Programs using the pthread library on LLVM
[93] framework to reproduce race and deadlocks. Again, this work operates at the
thread level.
Other work [90,91] attempts to reproduce deadlocks and concurrency bugs in Java
applications. Work by Yu and Pradel [92] attempts to detect, localize, and optimize
synchronization bottlenecks by using PIN [67], a binary instrumentation framework.
Our framework, on the other hand, focuses on concurrency fault reproduction at
the process level. Thus, our approach needs to overcome issues such as language
heterogeneity, dealing with system calls and signals, and dealing with different types of
shared resources. Our approach is also simple and requires no complicated mechanisms
such as recording and replaying [3]. Instead, we attack the error prone process of
manually injecting delays and turn it into an automated process. As shown in this
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work, the approach is also flexible and can handle various types of concurrency faults
and support different kernels and tools to monitor system events.
4.7 Conclusion
Debugging process-level concurrency faults is challenging because the sources of these
faults can occur in system-level events, and reproducing them requires favorable process
scheduling. To empower engineers with the tools needed to effectively debug process-
level races, we have introduced RCRF, a bug reproduction framework that provides
the observability and controllability necessary to effectively reproduce reported faults.
Our evaluation shows that RCRF is effective at reproducing challenging faults due to
under- and over-constrained process interactions (e.g., races, deadlock, and contention
delays). Given twenty previously reported, real-world faults, RCRF was able to
reproduce all of them while stress testing was able to reproduce only six. RCRF also
reveals other sources within a program that can produce reported faults, allowing
engineers to formulate repairs that address all sources. The framework also allows
engineers to explore whether other types of concurrency faults can occur on these
sources at modest cost.
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Chapter 5
RDSC: Applying Reaching
Definitions to Create a Generic Race
and Atomicity Violation Detector
5.1 Introduction
A prior study has shown that the most common cause of concurrency faults are
atomicity violations [1]. As previously mentioned, an atomicity violation occurs when
one process or thread can affect a shared resource’s state within a block of code that is
being executed by another process or thread. This means that concurrent executions
of these processes would generate different results than if these processes were executed
serially. The most challenging aspect of detecting atomicity violations, as well as
most types of concurrency faults, is that these faults can occur nondeterministically.
As such, we need to be able to observe the concurrent execution events and control
execution interleavings that give us the best chance to expose these faults.
In the context of our work, understanding how data is accessed and how it can flow
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from one application to the next is critical for detecting and reproducing concurrency
faults. More specifically, our work focuses on shared components that cannot be
easily seen by simply analyzing the source code. It requires that we observe various
operating system events to understand how two or more applications are related. As
such, our approach relies on dynamic analysis to gather these necessary kernel events
that can be used for processing.
As we have shown in Chapter 4, a mechanism that can effectively detect concurrency
faults is internal oracles or detectors, which specify correct execution interleavings so
that dynamic execution interleavings that do not match the correct ones are identified
as faults. For RCRF, we have used Linear Temporal Logic to construct internal
oracles to detect specific types of process-level races. We then used code injection to
create yield points that can amplify the chance of reproducing the reported faults.
However, to detect atomicity violations, instead of looking for conflicting pair of
operations that can race, we look for two sequences of operations or blocks of code
that should be atomically executed but can interleave with each other. To do so, we
rely on a data-flow technique based on reaching definitions that developers can use to
semantically and syntactically observe programs [94].
While it is possible to use mechanisms such as linear temporal logic or happen-
before relationship to detect atomicity violations [1], such mechanisms often require
that we reduce a sequence of instructions that must be executed atomically into an
event. In doing so, any parallel execution of two related events would indicate an
atomicity violations. While such approaches have been effective for detecting atomicity
violations, they do not provide sufficient information to reveal exactly where in an
atomic sequence a violation occurs and which operation causes the violation. Knowing
this information is important for atomicity violation reproduction based on known
or previously reported symptoms or behaviors. Our approach, based on reaching
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definitions, can provide such information because our approach considers all operations
and tracks the sources that cause a violation.
As an example, when an application deletes a file, there are multiple data structures
in addition to the file itself that must be modified. A typical file access often involves
accessing an i-node (data structure of filesystem objects of operating system). It
may also require changing permission, removing links to the file, and then creating
a new link that may be used to recover the file in the case of accidental delete or
drive corruption. These operations need to be done atomically to ensure that another
process that may need to access the same file does not incorrectly update the state of
the file. However, if we collapse all these operations into a single event, we may not be
able to identify the actual operation within the atomic block that causes the violation.
Furthermore, the violation may appear in the data structures that maintain the file’s
metadata or the actual file itself. Being able to observe every operation within an
atomic block provides us with more precise information about the violation.
In the example just given, we need to understand all the necessary operations
performed by the OS that are related to each file access. This is done by modeling
an event (e.g., writing to a file) to include relevant operations. Note that this is a
common procedure in prior techniques that deal with process-level races including
RACEPRO [3], SimRacer [66], and our own RCRF. Such modeling also gives us
insights into which sequences of system calls and operations must be done atomically.
Therefore, through this modeling process, we are able to define atomic blocks that
exist in these programs. We then apply reaching definitions analysis to help identify
atomic sequences of events from each application that can interact with those in other
applications through shared system resources, resulting in atomicity violations.
Because many types of races are also related to atomicity violations, we also
hypothesize that by developing an oracle to detect atomicity violations, we may be
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able to cover different types of races using just one oracle. In RCRF, we created 16
custom oracles based on fault descriptions reported in various repositories for the
applications we used. Each of these oracles looks for a specific pair of conflicting
operations that can be performed on a specific resource. This means that the window
for a race to occur is bound to those two operations colliding. The definition of
atomicity violation, on the other hand, is higher level and less restrictive. If a state
within an atomic block executed by a process can be seen by another process, we have
a violation. If each of those racy operations can be bound to an atomic block, we
would be able to detect races by using an atomicity violation detector.
RDSC is a new oracle that extends the collection of custom oracles used by
RCRF. It is based on an adaptive reaching definition algorithm for checking atomicity
violations found in kernel event log files. This adaptive algorithm is more precise than
a typical reaching definitions algorithm. By tracing the kernel event log file, the RDSC
semantically selects one execution path from the code and traces the path backward
to identify shared resources for potential atomicity violations. Because the traditional
reaching definitions algorithm statically traces back for usages of all variables on all
possible execution paths, this can lead to more generated information that must be
processed. In addition, it can also lead to more false positives.
To highlight the differences between our adaptive and a typical reaching definitions
algorithm, we compare the two algorithms in the next section. We then describe the
RDSC framework and empirically evaluate it using a subset of the applications (16
pairs) described in Chapter 3. We then report the results and discuss them in greater
detail. We then describe prior work related to RDSC.
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5.2 Background
5.2.1 Reaching Definitions (RD)
Reaching definitions is a static forward may data-flow approach that propagates a
value assigned to each variable from the beginning of a program to all reachable lines
of code or blocks. Each line or block of code has its own Gen() and Kill() function
to generate a new definition for new values stored in a variable and to remove prior
definitions. The analysis propagates information forward using transferring functions.
During the propagation along the line or the block of code, the definitions are modified
by Entry() and Exit() functions.
GenRD :
 GenRD([x = e]
line) = {(x, line)}
GenRD([...]
line) = ∅
(5.1)
KillRD :
 KillRD([x = e]
line) = {∀(x, l)|l ∈ ∪line}
KillRD([...]
line) = ∅
(5.2)
EntryRD(line) = ∪{ExitRD(line′)|line′ ∈ pred(line)} (5.3)
ExitRD(line) = (EntryRD(line) \KillRD(line)) ∪GenRD(line) (5.4)
Each line or block of code has its own GenRD() and KillRD() functions and
processes things differently depending on the operation. The GenRD() (Equation 5.1)
returns variable x and line of code if it is an assignment statement (x = e) and the
empty set if it is not. Also for the case of KillRD() (Equation 5.2), if the code is
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assigning a value to the variable x, then KillRD() returns a set of all existing definitions
of variable x, and returns ∅ for everything else.
The analysis propagates definitions forward along the control flow graph of a basic
block toward the next basic blocks. The goal of this process is to see if the definition
reaches a point in a program. EntryRD() and ExitRD() work as the transfer functions
to modify the definitions before reaching and after leaving the block or line of code,
respectively. With respect to reaching definitions, EntryRD() (Equation 5.3) is a
union of all ExitRD(line′) values or the value of definitions from the previous steps or
line, which can come from more than one direction based on the control flow graph.
ExitRD() (Equation 5.4) is simpler, getting EntryRD(), removing everything from
KillRD() and adding everything from GenRD().
01: private static double Average(int i) {
02: int x = 0;
03: double sum = 0;
04: while (x <= i) {
05: sum = sum + x;
06: x++;
07: }
08: return sum/i;
09: }
Figure 5.1: The control flow graph of a function "Average"
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show examples of how reaching definitions works. From Table 5.1,
Columns C and D show the Gen() and Kill() values for each line of code. From
Table 5.2, Columns C and D show the Entry() and Exit() values along the way as the
analysis goes on.
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Table 5.1: Gen() and Kill() for Each Line of Source Code
Line
(A)
Source code
(B)
Gen()
(C)
Kill()
(D)
01: private static double Average(int i) { {(i,1)} ∅
02: int x = 0; {(x,2)} ∅
03: double sum = 0; {(sum,3)} ∅
04: while (x <= i) { ∅ ∅
05: sum = sum + x; {(sum,5)} {(sum,3)(sum,5)}
06: x++; {(x,6)} {(x,2)(x,6)}
07: }
08: return sum/i; ∅ ∅
09: }
Table 5.2: Entry() and Exit() for Each Line of Source Code
Line
(A)
Source code
(B)
Entry()
(C)
Exit()
(D)
01: private static double Average(int i) { ∅ {(i,1)}
02: int x = 0; {(i,1)} {(i,1)(x,2)}
03: double sum = 0; {(i,1)(x,2)} {(i,1)(x,2)(sum,3)}
04: while (x <= i) { {(i,1)(x,2)(x,6)(sum,3)(sum,5)} {(i,1)(x,2)(x,6)(sum,3)(sum,5)}
05: sum = sum + x; {(i,1)(x,2)(x,6)(sum,3)(sum,5)} {(i,1)(x,2)(x,6)(sum,5)}
06: x++; {(i,1)(x,2)(x,6)(sum,5)} {(i,1)(x,6)(sum,5)}
07: }
08: return sum/i; {(i,1)(x,2)(x,6)(sum,3)(sum,5)} {(i,1)(x,2)(x,6)(sum,3)(sum,5)}
09: }
In Table 5.1, source code lines 1 - 3 are the initializations for new variables, so
they have only Gen() values without Kill() values. Lines 4 and 8 are not assignment
statements. In line 5 of the source code, the variable sum is added to the variable x,
so Gen() returns a set with a pair of variable sum and line number 5, while Kill()
kills all existing definitions of variable sum, which include the variable sum from
lines 3 and 5. The code in line 6 with variable x is handled simillarly; Gen() returns
{(x, 6)} and Kill() returns all existing definitions of variable x: {(x, 2)(x, 6)}.
The propagation carries all definitions of all variables along the control flow graph,
allowing us to better understand the behavior of the code. As an example, the reaching
definitions analysis proceeds iteratively from line 1 of the source code down to line 9
along the data flow path shown in Figure 5.1. According to Table 5.2, the analysis
starts at line 1 with Entry() returning the empty set and Exit() returning the first
definition of variable i. The definition from Exit() is passed through its successor
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(line 2) as Exit() returns another new definitions of x, and these steps occur again in
line 3.
The analysis begins to perform differently at line 4 of the source code. This line
has two data flow directions from lines 3 and 6; the Entry() unions the exit from
lines 3 and 6 and the Exit() results from Entry() deleting the values from Kill() and
adding the values from Gen(). The analysis works the same on lines 5 - 6.
The analysis focuses on the definition of one variable and determines if it can
naturally reach or block of code. For example, if we want to determine if the value of
variable x in line 2 can reach line 8, we look for the definition on line 8. Definition
(x, 2) on the Exit() of line 8 shows that the value from line 2 can reach the end.
5.2.2 Adaptive Reaching Definitions (ARD)
There are two alternative ways we can control and observe the behavior of RD analysis.
First, we can run the analysis through a sequential program and see how the analysis
steps through the data flow from the first line of code to the last line (Figure 5.2).
Second, since each definition of each variable is independent of the others, we can alter
the algorithm to focus on one variable at a time. This simplifies the set of definitions
that we need to track and reduces the amount of information being generated. Next
we describe these two approaches in turn.
5.2.2.1 Using a sequential program
We use a simple a sequential program to observe how RD analysis works and how the
definitions from sequential program are modified. Note that there is only one entry
into each point of code, which changes the reaching definitions analysis from a may
analysis to be a must analysis. Also , there is only one definition for one variable as
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01: double c = 0; 
02: System.out.print("enter a: ");
03: int data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt();
04: c = (data * data);
05: System.out.print("enter b: ");
06: data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt();
07: c += (data * data);
08: System.out.println("c = "+Math.sqrt(c));
Figure 5.2: Sequential flow code to calculate the hypotenuse in the Pythagorean
theorem
Table 5.3: Gen() and Kill() for Each Line in a Sequential Program
Line
(A)
Source code
(B)
Gen()
(C)
Kill()
(D)
01: double c = 0; {(c,1)} ∅
02: System.out.print("enter a: "); ∅ ∅
03: int data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt(); {(data,3)} {(data,3)(data,6)}
04: c = (data * data); {(c,4)} {(c,1)(c,4)(c,7)}
05: System.out.print("enter b: "); ∅ ∅
06: data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt(); {(data,6)} {(data,3)(data,6)}
07: c += (data * data); {(c,7)} {(c,1)(c,4)(c,7)}
08: System.out.println("c = "+Math.sqrt(c)); ∅ ∅
Table 5.4: Entry() and Exit() for Each Line in a Sequential Program
Line
(A)
Source code
(B)
Entry()
(C)
Exit()
(D)
01: double c = 0; ∅ {(c,1)}
02: System.out.print("enter a: "); {(c,1)} {(c,1)}
03: int data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt(); {(c,1)} {(c,1)(data,3)}
04: c = (data * data); {(c,1)(data,3)} {(c,4)(data,3)}
05: System.out.print("enter b: "); {(c,4)(data,3)} {(c,4)(data,3)}
06: data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt(); {(c,4)(data,3)} {(c,4)(data,6)}
07: c += (data * data); {(c,4)(data,6)} {(c,7)(data,6)}
08: System.out.println("c = "+Math.sqrt(c)); {(c,7)(data,6)} {(c,7)(data,6)}
shown in Table 5.4. Kill() kills all prior definitions whenever the variable has been
newly reassigned and Gen() creates new definitions (Table 5.3).
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Table 5.5: Entry() and Exit() Focusing on the Variable "c" Only
Line
(A)
Source code
(B)
Entry()
(C)
Exit()
(D)
01: double c = 0; ∅ {(c,1)}
02: System.out.print("enter a: "); {(c,1)} {(c,1)}
03: int data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt(); {(c,1)} {(c,1)}
04: c = (data * data); {(c,1)} {(c,4)}
05: System.out.print("enter b: "); {(c,4)} {(c,4)}
06: data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt(); {(c,4)} {(c,4)}
07: c += (data * data); {(c,4)} {(c,7)}
08: System.out.println("c = "+Math.sqrt(c)); {(c,7)} {(c,7)}
Table 5.6: Entry() and Exit() Focusing on the Variable "Data" Only
Line
(A)
Source code
(B)
Entry()
(C)
Exit()
(D)
01: double c = 0; ∅ ∅
02: System.out.print("enter a: "); ∅ ∅
03: int data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt(); ∅ {(data,3)}
04: c = (data * data); {(data,3)} {(data,3)}
05: System.out.print("enter b: "); {(data,3)} {(data,3)}
06: data = new Scanner(System.in).nextInt(); {(data,3)} {(data,6)}
07: c += (data * data); {(data,6)} {(data,6)}
08: System.out.println("c = "+Math.sqrt(c)); {(data,6)} {(data,6)}
5.2.2.2 Focusing on one resource at a time
RD does not focus on the reading of variables; instead, it focuses on assignments to
variables. Thus, we can treat each variable as independent in our analysis. To do
so, we can modify the algorithm to concentrate on one variable at a time. This is
beneficial for eliminating long sequences of code that rarely touch the variable. The
algorithm can also eliminate several irrelevant lines of code before running the analysis
as shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, which renders the analysis faster and more efficient.
5.3 Introducing RDSC
In this section, we introduce RDSC, an oracle based on an adaptive reaching definitions
algorithm, that analyzes kernel event logs for atomicity violations. We focus is
on atomicity violations that can occur in each shared resource due to accesses by
concurrent threads or processes. Since these threads or processes may use many
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shared resources, we want to efficiently optimize the algorithm, by processing one
shared resource at a time, and eliminating kernel events that have nothing to do with
the targeted shared resources. As such, the process iteratively identifies all possible
shared resources among concurrent threads or processes and eliminates kernel events
not related to such resources. Afterward, it applies the proposed atomicity violation
detection approach based on reaching definitions as the oracle.
5.3.1 RDSC Workflow
Log	
File
1.	Filtering	out	irrelevant	system	calls	
to	the	shared	resource.
2.	Performing	the	RDSC
The	pool	
of	Shared	
Resource
Selecting	a	shared	
resource	at	a	time
Report
Repeating	to	test	with	
other	shared	resources.
(Optional)
List	of	system	calls	touching	
the	shared	resource.
Figure 5.3: Using RDSC to detect atomicity violations in system call logs
Figure 5.3 shows how to iterate over one shared resource at a time from the
resource pool (A) and filter out irrelevant lines of kernel events (Box 1) from the log
file. The new pruned log is sent to the atomicity violation detector (Box 2) and a final
atomicity violation report is produced. If there are more shared resources in the pool,
the process repeats.
Algorithm 2 details the workflow. Line 2 filters out unrelated kernel event lines
from the log, while the functions in lines 3 and 4 segregate the new list (OSh) into
two groups according to the program that generates the events (e.g., PN1 and PN2).
All the information is then provided to the atomicity violation detector and used to
produce the violation report (Rs).
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Algorithm 2 The framework
Require: a set of shared resource (Sh),
a list of system calls from parallel processing of processes (LSC),
an optimized list of system calls accessing the shared resource si (OSh)
1: for all (si) ∈ Sh do
2: OSh← filteringOut_Irrelevant_SystemCalls(si, LSC)
3: PN1 ← collectingAllSubProcess(OSh, 1)
4: PN2 ← collectingAllSubProcess(OSh, 2)
5: Rs[si]← isRDSC(si, OSh, PN1, PN2)
6: end for
7: return a set of result for each shared resource (Rs)
5.3.2 Applying ARD on System Call Logs (RDSC)
Algorithm 3 presents the process used to check for atomicity violations inside a
targeted list of system calls by applying the ARD algorithm. Given a list of system
calls, we capture the dynamic kernel event log that lists the kernel’s operations,
including accessing the specific shared resources and possibly containing atomicity
violations (OSh). The proposed RDSC look in the log for atomicity violations caused
by processes.
Inside the log, there are main processes and sub processes. The RDSC creates
two sets of events (PN1, PN2), each belonging to a process. For example, a log may
include operations by the main process and operations by its child processes.
Algorithm 3 focuses on atomicity violations that occur when multiple processes race
(Osh) for a particular shared resource (s). In this algorithm, we use three variables to
trace the list of system calls (OSh). First, LatestWritting (initialized in line 1) is a
collection of the latest "writing" system call (into the shared resource), so we can look
back for it. The second variable, Counter (initialized in line 2) is for counting the
number of context switch. The atomic block is not completed until the second context
switch happens. The last one is prev (initialized in line 3). This is a collection of the
previous system calls to use for comparison.
69
Algorithm 3 isRDSC (Reaching Definition Algorithm on System Call Log)
Require: the shared resource (s),
a list of suspected SysCalls (OSh),
a set of process number on Group one (PN1),
a set of process number on Group two (PN2)
1: LatestWritting ← {sc0}
2: Counter = 0
3: Prev ← {sc0}
4: for all (sci ∈ OSh) do
5: if (isSwitched(Prev, {sci})) then
6: Counter ++
7: if (Counter > 1) then
8: if (not fromTheSameSide(LatestWritting, {sci})) then
9: return true
10: end if
11: end if
12: end if
13:
14: if (isWriting(sci)) then
15: LatestWritting ← {sci}
16: end if
17:
18: Prev = {sci}
19: end for
20: return false
With respect to data flow analysis, Gen() and Kill() are the sets for generating the
transfer function of each block or statement in the source code. The transfer function
contains all variables that have been modified inside that block or statement and the
definitions depend on the algorithm or analysis. RDSC, however, analyzes one shared
resource at a time as shown from lines 4 to 19. Variable LatestWriting represents
the definition of that particular shared resource. Gen() and Kill() are processed in
lines 14 to 16. Gen() generates {sci} and Kill() works by simply replacing the value
into the variable LatestWritting in line 15.
Typically, the classic reaching definitions algorithm starts from the beginning of
the program and propagates information through the end. However, RDSC is designed
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to detect atomicity violations. As such, we terminate propagations of definitions as
soon as RDSC detects an atomicity violation. Inside the algorithm, the code in lines 5
to 12 and line 18 works as an atomicity violation checking mechanism. The detection
process works in concert with RCRF, which helps amplify the chance of reproducing
atomicity violations by inserting yield points to suspend each process.
To illustrate this algorithm, assume that a process P0 is suspended due to quantum
expiration. At this point, the system observes the state of a faulty shared resource.
This is done by simply identifying the last write operation, by reading the value stored
in LatestWriting. Assume that while P0 is blocked, P1 is scheduled and writes to
the same shared resource. This would cause an update in LatestWriting. When P0
returns, it checks LatestWriting and finds that the state of the shared resource has
been changed by P1.
5.4 Empirical Study
The adaptive reaching definitions algorithm can help us dynamically detect atomicity
violations. With the reproduction capability of RCRF, we can exercise a large range
of process interleavings. When we study RCRF, we create an oracle to be applicable
to a type of reported race. Typically, such an oracle cannot be generically applied to
other types of races as they may use different resources and the system calls used to
access those resources may also be different. The proposed algorithm based on ARD
produces a more generic oracle so it can be applicable across diverse types of races.
We conducted an empirical study to answer the following two research questions.
RQ1: By including a RDSC oracle in RCRF, how effective is RDSC on detecting
known races during reproduction?
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RQ2: By including a RDSC oracle in RCRF, can we reduce the number of custom
oracles previously used to evaluate RCRF?
5.4.1 Object of Analysis
We use the first 16 pairs of applications described in Chapter 3. For the time being,
RDSC is implemented to detect atomicity violations on files. The other four application
pairs not included in this study use shared resources other than files so our oracle
would not be able to detect violations. However, we can extend RDSC to cover
atomicity violations on these and other types of shared resources.
5.4.2 Variables and Measures
Independent Variable. We wish to measure the effectiveness of our new algorithm,
RDSC, in generically detecting atomicity violations and subsequently races that were
previously reproduced by RCRF. We also wish to measure the savings in terms of the
number of custom oracles that must be developed to effectively reproduce races. As
such, our baseline system is RCRF.
Dependent Variable. The effectiveness of RDSC (RQ1) is determined by the
numbers of races in each application that the custom oracle and RDSC can detect
during the reproduction attempts. We again define two types of races that can be
detected, dynamic and static. When an execution detects one or more races, we count
these as detected races. However, we exercise each interleaving 100 times, so it is
possible that the same race may be detected repeatedly across these 100 runs. As
such, the usefulness of dynamic races is to show the effectiveness of our technique to
reproduce races. Static races, on the other hand, report the unique sources of races
that have been detected across the 100 runs.
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With respect to RQ2, we compare the number of oracles that we need to reproduce
races in the 16 pairs of applications. For RCRF, we use custom oracles. We then use
RDSC alone to try to detect these races. For the cases in which we could not detect
all races that have been previously detected by the custom oracles, we simply add
the custom oracle for that particular type of race to improve detection effectiveness.
At the end of the evaluation process, we record the number of oracles (i.e., RDSC
+ custom oracles) that we need to detect the same races detected by using custom
oracles alone.
5.4.3 Study Methodology
The methodology we used to evaluate RDSC is similar to that used to evaluate
RCRF. Again, we executed each pair multiple times to help neutralize the effect of
non-determinism. In addition, as we only tried to use a generic oracle (RDSC) instead
of multiple customized oracles to detect multiple types of races, we want to ensure we
use enough runs to detect as many types of races that can occur within each pair of
programs. As such, we run each pairs of applications 100 times instead of 10.
5.4.4 Threats to Validity
The primary threat to external validity in this study involves the object programs
utilized. We have studied just 16 pairs of faulty programs. However, the programs
are real and the faults are real and non-trivial to reproduce. A second threat involves
the representativeness of our oracles. These threats can be addressed only through
further studies.
The primary threat to internal validity involves potential errors in the implemen-
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Table 5.7: Comparing Dynamically Detected Faults Between RCRF and RDSC
PuD1
(A)
PuD2
(B)
Total Runs
(C)
RCRF
(D)
RDSC
(E)
RCRF ∩ RDSC
(F)
updatedb updatedb 3600 1229 2517 467
locate updatedb 3600 200 2391 0
bash bash 78400 13098 30796 13088
mv rm 6400 600 1100 402
rm(fst) symlink 2400 126 202 0
mkdir cleaner 400 99 101 99
mknod cleaner 400 101 101 101
mkfifo cleaner 400 100 100 100
mkdir2 cleaner 400 100 100 100
mknod2 cleaner 400 100 100 100
mkfifo2 cleaner 400 100 100 100
ln cleaner 2400 400 1199 400
find cleaner2 1600 299 327 299
csplit msigshooter 1600 600 300 300
pxz stealer 3200 1841 322 322
logrotate stealer2 30800 4101 3603 3323
tations of RDSC and the infrastructure used to reproduce races. To limit these we
extensively validated all of our tool components and scripts.
The primary threat to construct validity relates to the fact that we study effec-
tiveness and savings relative to applications of RDSC, but do not yet assess whether
the approach helps engineers localize and correct targeted faults more quickly than
current approaches.
5.4.5 Results
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 provide data for both research questions. Columns A and B are
the program pair (PuD1 and PuD2). These program pairs are the subset of objects of
analysis used to evaluate RCRF. Column C in Table 5.7 is the total number of runs,
using 100 runs per interleaving. For example, in the case of updatedb – updatedb,
we have 36 potential interleavings that involve shared resources. We exercise each
interleaving 100 times and therefore, the number of total runs is 3,600. Column C in
Table 5.8 is the total number of potential sources of races based on a particular resource
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Table 5.8: Comparing Unique Faults Between RCRF and RDSC
PuD1
(A)
PuD2
(B)
Potential
Source of Race
(C)
RCRF
(D)
RDSC
(E)
RCRF ∩ RDSC
(F)
updatedb updatedb 9 5 9 5
locate updatedb 9 2 9 2
bash bash 196 70 84 70
mv rm 16 5 6 5
rm(fst) symlink 6 1 1 1
mkdir cleaner 1 1 1 1
mknod cleaner 1 1 1 1
mkfifo cleaner 1 1 1 1
mkdir2 cleaner 1 1 1 1
mknod2 cleaner 1 1 1 1
mkfifo2 cleaner 1 1 1 1
ln cleaner 6 2 4 2
find cleaner2 4 1 1 1
csplit msigshooter 4 2 1 1
pxz stealer 8 7 1 1
logrotate stealer2 77 16 16 15
between the two programs. For example, in the case of updatedb – updatedb, we
have nine potential sources of races that involve a shared resource.
To answer RQ1, we compare the results listed in Columns D and E in both tables
and report in the intersection in Column F. For Table 5.7, Column D reports the
number of total faults dynamically detected by the customized oracles based on Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) used to evaluate RCRF, and Column E is the number of faults
dynamically detected by RDSC. We identify the same faults that have been detected
by both RCRF (Column D) and RDSC (Column E) for each pair of PuDs, and report
that result in Column F.
An atomicity violation may result in a type of race that our customized oracle is not
designed to detect (e.g., a customized oracle is designed to detect file corruptions but
not i-node corruptions), so we turn our attention to the atomicity violations that are
also detected as races by our customized oracles. As shown in Column F of Table 5.7,
RDSC can detect over 99% of the faults that were detected by our customized oracles
in nine pairs of apps. These are bash-bash, mkdir-cleaner, mknod-cleaner,
mkfifo-cleaner, mkdir2-cleaner, mknod2-cleaner, mkfifo2-cleaner, find-
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cleaner2, and csplit-msigshooter. It can partially detect similar faults in five of
the remaining seven pairs of applications (81% or less). It cannot detect any similar
faults in the remaing two pairs of applications.
In terms of atomicity violation effectiveness, updatedb-updatedb has the greatest
number of runs with detectable atomicity violations at 70%. locate-updatedb
and ln-cleaner have 66% and 50% of the total runs that have detectable atomicity
violations. RDSC detects atomicity violations in fewer than 40% of the total runs for
the remaining pairs of applications. Note that RDSC can detect atomicity violations
in 14 out of 16 pairs of apps.
In terms of fault detection effectiveness, Column D in Table 5.8 reports the number
of unique faults that have been reproduced by RCRF during the 100 runs. Again, a
unique fault is referred to as at least one instance of a possible fault that has been
exercised. A potential fault may have been exercised many times in a sequence of
repetitive runs. As long as at least one run exercises that fault, we count it as a unique
fault. Column E is the number of unique faults that have been reproduced by RDSC
during the 100 runs. We identify the same faults that have been detected by both
RCRF (Column D) and RDSC (Column E) for each pair of PuDs, and report that
result in Column F.
As shown in Column F in Table 5.8, RDSC can detect the same faults detected by
RCRF in 13 out of 16 pairs of applications. The only exceptions are the last three
pairs of applications, wherein the majority of races are not due to atomicity violations.
This suggests that RDSC can be used as a general race detector for process-level races.
Turning to RQ2, we first list the names of all oracles that are available in Table 5.9.
Next, we compare the numbers of oracle that RCRF and RDSC use by listing them
in Table 5.10. Column (A) shows the framework, Columns (B) and (C) are the pairs
of PuDs, and Columns (D) to (V) are oracle numbers. In Table 5.10, we list the
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Table 5.9: List of Oracle Numbers and Names Used in RCRF and RDSC
Number Name of Oracle
1 ARD
2 File Existing
3 One Rename
4 Two Rename
5 Modified While Using
6 Read Once
7 Double Open
8 Unlink Non-Existing
9 Unlink Once
10 Unlink Twice
11 Chmod Once
12 Rmdir Once
13 Cannot Remove
14 Error between stat + unlink
15 Error between unlink + symlink
16 Cannot remove folder
17 Clear all files
18 Unzip the Log file
19 Unzip the PXZ file
oracle that each pair of PuDs use and mark them as "1". In the last row of each
framework we mark the oracle they use with "Y", before counting the number of "Ys"
and showing it in Column (C) on the same row.
According to the results, we are able to reduce the number of custom oracles based
on LTLs from 18 to 4. This is because RDSC alone can replace 14 LTL oracles. This
results in a 77.78% reduction in the number of oracles. We also see three cases where
RDSC is in effective in detecting those types of races and therefore, custom oracles
designed to detect such races would still be needed.
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Effectiveness
The results in Columns D and E of Table 5.7 collaborate that RDSC is more effective
than LTLs. RDSC can detect more faults than LTLs. However, we also have three
cases wherein RDSC is not effective. The reason that RDSC cannot detect one
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Table 5.10: Results Comparing Oracles Used Between RCRF and RDSC
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particular race in csplit-msigshooter is because the race is a low-level data race.
The specific LTL to detect this race has been designed to monitor the results from
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manipulating the interleaving by RCRF. However, the RDSC can detect a different
fault in csplit that is not detected by RCRF. This particular race is due to the signal
handler trying to remove a file. This is an example of a difference in capability of
RCRF and RDSC.
For the other two pairs of applications, pxz-stealer and logrotate-stealer2,
RDSC cannot detect all the races detected by RCRF. Similar to the case above, the
LTLs used by RCRF have been created to detect specific faults based on the reports,
while RDSC is more about code analysis via data-flow. However, RDSC is able to
detect one atomicity violation in pxz and logrotate that is not detectable by any
customized oracle.
5.6 Work Related to RDSC
Atomicity violation at the thread level has been well studied by several prior research
efforts [16, 28, 33, 74, 75,77]. While many approaches such as Eraser [28], CHESS [74],
and DEJAVU [16] find the concurrency bug in general, tools like Atomizer [77] and
CTrigger [75] focus on the atomicity violation or both atomicity violation and order
violations [33].
Eraser [28] uses the lock-set approach to find the data races in a multithread
program. However CHESS expands on this to cover more on memory corruption,
deadlock, and livelock [74]. In addition, Atomizer [33] and Ai [77] use the lockset
approach to capture atomicity violation dynamically.
DEJAVU [16] uses a yield point technique to enforce interleavings and also uses
the record/replay mechanism to observe non-deterministic execution later. In addition
to DEJAVU, CTrigger [75] also uses an approach based on record/replay to capture
atomicity violations. The aforementioned approaches have been designed to target
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races, order violations, and atomicity violations in multithreaded programs. Therefore,
their main focus is on detecting and reproducing shared memory access violations.
Our approach, on the other hand, has been designed specifically to address the need
of reproducing process-level races and atomicity violations. Our work requires the
observation a much larger class of shared resources including those that can be accessed
by system calls and signals. Our work also supports fault detection when programs
are written in different languages.
With respect to reachability testing, there have been many approaches used to
dynamically test concurrent programs [95,96,97]. To test for synchronization faults, a
reachability based approach exhaustively exercises the programs without previously
constructing any static model [95]. The approach combines nondeterministic and
deterministic testing [96] to create sequences called SYN-sequences representing the
interleavings between processes and threads. Monitoring tools such as Butterfly Anal-
ysis [98] and ParaLog [99] apply reaching definitions to monitor running applications
for bugs and security attacks. They have been shown to be effective. However, a
major shortcoming of this approach is that it can incur high runtime overhead as the
number of resources that must be monitored can be quite large.
Our approach exploits the dynamic nature of this approach to reproduce races.
However, as a race reproduction framework, our approach does not need to monitor all
resources that can possibly encounter faults. Instead, we use bug reports to determine
which resources must be monitored and then apply reaching definitions to observe
accesses to these resources as part of fault reproduction. This allows our approach to
reduce the overhead of reaching definitions.
80
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown that one way to reduce the effort required to reproduce
a specific concurrency fault is to adopt a reaching definitions based oracle that can
detect a large class of races. By using the proposed RDSC, we are able to replace
15 customized oracles with a single oracle without suffering from degradation in
effectiveness. As our empirical results indicate, RDSC can detect the same races as
those detected by customized oracles in 13 out of 16 pairs of applications. At the
same time, the study also reveals limitations of RDSC that can be addressed as part
of future work.
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Chapter 6
CFI: Concurrency Faults Inspector
6.1 Introduction
As previously mentioned, the most prolific type of real-world concurrency fault is the
data race [1]. This particular type of fault occurs when multiple processes, signals,
and interrupts improperly access shared resources. Due to non-determinism, even
races that have been reported by users in bug repositories are still quite difficult to
reproduce [3,66,100]. Typically, there are three critical elements needed for a good race
report. They are (i) the faulty application, (ii) its symptoms, and (iii) the inducing
application(s). However, race reports do not always contain all three elements. For
example, in one particular report [101], users did not disclose the inducing application.
Reports with such missing information make reproducing races even more challenging.
To ease the process of reproducing races from incomplete bug reports, we need a
framework that is able to identify possible applications from within a given set (or a
universe) of applications that can interact with the reported application to reproduce
the reported race. One possible approach is to exhaustively run every application
within the universe alongside the reported application using testing techniques such
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as RCRF to try to reproduce the reported race. However, this process can be highly
inefficient especially if the number of applications in a universe is large.
An alternative approach, introduced in this work, is to project possible interleavings
and then compute whether those projected interleavings can cause the reported race.
In this approach, we do not need to run these applications alongside the reported
application. Instead, we create a list of Virtual Interleavings (VIs) between the
vulnerable application and a universe of possibly inducing applications. The selection
of applications in the universe can be based on correlating known shared resources.
Deriving known shared resources requires us to run each app once through our
observation tools (see Chapter 4 for the tool we used and the list of other possible
tools) without forcing specific interleavings. We can then pass these VIs through
oracles to predict whether an application can race with the reported application. With
this approach, we hypothesize that it is possible to develop an efficient and effective
testing framework to reproduce races from incomplete bug reports.
In this chapter, we propose Concurrency Fault Inspector (CFI), a framework that
can find a set of applications sharing a similar resource usage pattern as that of the
reported application so that they can possibly induce the same race as indicated in
an incomplete bug report. This framework explores a universe of applications that
can run on the same system as that of the reported application to find one or many
race-inducing applications. The framework first executes each application using its
test suite to identify shared resources and sequences of system calls and signals that it
uses. Next, it generates a list of unique and possible VIs before predicting the result
using a set of classifiers; each is designed to detect a specific class of concurrency faults.
Finally, it employs RCRF to confirm the presence of races by trying to reproduce
them between the reported application and the predicted applications.
We evaluate the performance of CFI using 117 applications from four universes
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of applications with known faults. Our results indicate that CFI is effective (100%
accuracy in our case study) in predicting applications that can induce races in the
reported apps. In doing so, it can reduce the testing time by 35%.
In summary, the contributions of this chapter are as follows.
1. We propose Concurrency Fault Inspector (CFI) to identify race-inducing appli-
cations in a universe of applications.
2. We design a feature model, generate a training dataset, and experiment with
multiple classification algorithms to determine the most accurate algorithm for
the given problem. We then perform training and testing to construct a model
to classify whether generated VIs can cause a reported race.
3. We perform a case study to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the
CFI Framework against that of RCRF to perform an exhaustive evaluation of
all applications in a universe. Our results indicate that CFI is more efficient
than an approach that performs exhaustive testing using RCRF. It can also
accurately predict applications that can race with a given application.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides an overview
of background information related to this work. Section 6.3 describes the architecture
of the CFI framework. Section 6.4 reports our experimental setup to conduct our case
study using an incomplete race report and a universe of 117 applications, it also reports
the results of our investigation. Section 6.5 discusses the implications of our results
and the usefulness of CFI to potentially isolate and debug race conditions. Section 6.6
highlights prior work related to CFI. The last section concludes this chapter.
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6.2 Background
This section discusses background information related to incomplete bug reports and
how we can extract information that can be used to help CFI identify race-inducing
applications.
6.2.1 Analyzing Incomplete Bug Reports
Bug repositories provide a way for users to report faulty behaviors of applications that
occur in the field back to the developers. In many systems, bug tracking applications are
embedded into systems (e.g., Apple software products or Microsoft operating systems)
to automatically formulate reports and request user’s permissions to send the report
back to developers when the systems encounter problems. However, there are also
many applications that require users to manually report faulty symptoms. For example,
BugZilla [102] is the web-based bug-tracker for Mozilla projects. Launchpad [103] is
the website to help developers maintaining GNU software and a part of this site also
includes a large collection of bug reports from users.
Information that can help developers debug process-level races includes the reported
application (i.e., the application that exhibits symptom), the symptoms, and the
race-inducing application(s). The report should also include system configurations or
other specific information such as the system specification (e.g., software version, OS
version). It should also include any generated error messages or log files. Often, each
of the symptoms or faulty behaviors requires different evidence or information to help
developers debug the applications. Thus, it is common for developers to ask users to
provide as much information as possible when reporting faults.
Bug analysis, however, is not an easy task. Most users try to perform a preliminary
diagnosis before reporting them. However, the complexity of process-level races can
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cause users to mis-diagnose the problems. We have seen bug reports that do not
contain sufficient information to diagnose the faults [104]. There are also bug reports
that contain incorrect information about the real causes of races [105, 106]. For
example, in report [36], the error appears to originate from calling the find command.
As such, the problem was initially sent to be fixed by the configuration team. A year
later, this problem was rerouted to the team that maintains lower-level software that
resides in the GNU findutils.
We have also seen many examples of incomplete reports related to concurrency
faults. There are race reports that provide the wrong diagnosis of the sources of the
problem [36,105, 106] or omit important information [104]. Some race reports disclose
the vulnerable applications but do not identify the inducing applications [101,107]. For
example, reports may show a symptom of simply displaying an error message, where
that particular message alone does not identify the inducing application [101, 107].
While typical users can often identify the presence of data races in an application,
knowing which other application(s) can induce that particular race may not be trivial.
The goal of CFI is to help engineers identify race-inducing applications when a race
report does not disclose such information.
Figure 6.1 [101] is an example of an incomplete bug report. A user reports an error
in MySQL from the signal handler epoll. The report includes the symptom (i.e., a
bad file descriptor error message), an explanation of how the race occurs, and a repair
that has been applied. However, the proposed repair does not fix this fault; it simply
changes some configurations and makes a simple repair to an API. This repair, in
effect, masks the fault. It does not address the sources that corrupt the file descriptor.
Further diagnostics reveal that a data race is the source. However, the engineer still
does not know which application races with it.
Figure 6.2 [107] is another race report that does not disclose the inducing application.
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Figure 6.1: Bug report from MySQL number 36537
87
Figure 6.2: Bug report from Slidematch number 641521
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The report contains the symptom and the incorrect output from the application.
However, there is no diagnotic information. As such, this fault could not be reproduced
and therefore, has not been repaired. The report now has the status of incomplete.
Part of analyzing a race report is to determine for certain whether there is indeed
a data race. If there is, then we want to know what type of race it is (e.g., a race on
file-related resources or a race on shared memory). The critical information that must
be extracted is where the engineer can observe the race if she is able to reproduce it.
Typically, shared resources are files, file structures (iNodes), memory, pipes, or devices
like network ports or channels. However, not all races show clear symptoms [37,45].
Sometimes, races can cause silent errors that may not be noticeable [38]. As such, the
ability to extract information from incomplete bug reports may be based on the prior
experience of developers or engineers. However, in Chapter 4 we have described tools
that can help identify resource usage within an application.
6.2.2 Converting A Happen-Before Graph to Feature Matrix
In Chapter 4, we used Happen-Before graphs [70] to represent sequences of kernel
events. The concept of Happen-before has also been used in prior work to represent
interleavings between processes [59,66]. For CFI, we also use Happen-before graphs
in the form of a feature matrix to train and test our classifiers.
Creating a feature matrix to represent a Happen-before graph requires more than
just the edge before and after our target node. We also need to encode the relationships
between our target node and the rest of the nodes inside the graph. For example,
Figure 6.3 shows the relationship among the nodes inside a Happen-before graph. To
represent the graph as a matrix, we need to include all nodes and their relationships.
To generate a feature matrix for every single interleaving, we use the data from
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readopenstat64 stat64 unlink close
Figure 6.3: Relationship between nodes in a Happen-before graph
the kernel event log. After the kernel event log is processed to select only the relevant
events, we set a mark on each event to indicate the caller of the event. This is done
by setting a cell in the matrix to ‘1’. An illustration of our feature matrix is shown in
Figure 6.4.
readopenstat64 stat64 unlink close
1stat64 1open 1read 2stat64 2unlink 1close
Figure 6.4: Labeling the feature from the happen-before graph
We use the relevant kernel events to represent the column and the row of each
feature matrix and initialize every cell inside the matrix to 0. On every graph, there
are edges to represent the relationship between the nodes. We define every edge on
the graph by marking it as 1 on the feature matrix. For example, Figure 6.5 shows
an edge between the system call 1stat64 and 1open. As such, we set the cell that is
defined by 1stat64 (row 1) and 1open (column 3) to 1. As a reminder, the number
before each event (e.g., 1stat64) indicates the process that calls that event. Figure 6.6
illustrates a complete feature matrix.
Next, we introduce the proposed Concurrency Fault Inspector (CFI) framework.
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1read1open1stat64 2stat64 2unlink 1close
1stat64 1open 1read 2stat64 2unlink 1close
1stat64 0 1 0 0 0 0
1open 0 0 0 0 0 0
1read 0 0 0 0 0 0
2stat64 0 0 0 0 0 0
2unlink 0 0 0 0 0 0
1close 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 6.5: Initializing the feature matrix
6.3 Introducing Concurrency Fault Inspector (CFI)
Concurrency Fault Inspector or CFI is a framework to help developers identify
inducing applications that cause concurrency faults in incomplete race reports. To
identify inducing applications for a particular fault, the framework needs three types
of inputs that can be extracted from a bug report. The first input is the vulnerable
application and its test suite that can be used to exercise the application. This is
necessary as CFI operates based on dynamic information. The second input is the
symptom. As previously shown, analyzing a reported symptom can often reveal the
location where the fault occurs. Knowing the location also leads us to the third input,
which is the previously designed and implemented oracle that can be used to detect
occurrences of that particular fault. In this work, we use the same oracles as those
used in RCRF.
Figure 6.7 illustrates the overview framework of the CFI. As shown, there are
four major components: Collector, Synthesizer, Trainer, and Verifier.
Each component processes information and then passes the results to the subsequent
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1stat64 1open 1read 2stat64 2unlink 1close
1stat64 0 1 1 1 1 1
1open 0 0 1 1 1 1
1read 0 0 0 1 1 1
2stat64 0 0 0 0 1 1
2unlink 0 0 0 0 0 1
1close 0 0 0 0 0 0
1read1open1stat64 2stat64 2unlink 1close
Figure 6.6: The feature matrix represents the happen-before graph
component. As such, the workflow is sequential. The workflow starts with Collector
(component A). The inputs to this component are the reported application and its test
suite. In addition, it also takes the entire universe of applications and the corresponding
test suites of all applications in the universe.
Next, Collector runs each application using its test suite on a system that
employs tools that can observe and record kernel events (such tools include Scribe [59]
and Strace [108]). At the end of this process, Collector produces kernel event
log files of the reported application and all applications in the provided universe. It
then processes these log files to include only events that are potentially relevant to
the reported fault. This is done by previously analyzing the reported symptom to
identify possible resources that can suffer from the reported concurrency fault. In this
step, Collector also removes duplicated events prior to passing these lists of kernel
events to Synthesizer, component B in Figure 6.7.
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A. Collector
B. Synthesizer
C. Trainer
D. Verifier
Vulnerable Application 
+ Test Suites
Inducing Application
+ Test Suites
List of Shared 
Resource
Oracles
Dataset from 
Previous runs
Results
List of kernel event log
Virtual interleaving and Dataset
Prediction results
Figure 6.7: Workflow in CFI
Synthesizer consists of two additional sub-components: Virtual interleav-
ings Generator (VIG) and Dataset Synthesizer (DS). These two components
work independently, but they share the same system call event logs provided by
Collector.
To identify a fault-inducing application, it is necessary to consider every possible
interleaving between the vulnerable application and the application under inspection.
However, running all possible interleavings can be an expensive process. Instead, we
developed a Virtual interleaving Generator to reason about each possible
interleaving and determine whether it can cause the reported fault. Our VIG can
generate Virtual interleavings (VIs) by manipulating kernel events invoked
by the two applications to create a list of possible interleavings. Each list is then
evaluated by a corresponding Oracle to determine whether it can possibly lead to
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the reported concurrency fault. Once race-leading lists of interleavings have been
identified, they will be verified by our last component, Verifier (component D).
In addition to generating VIs, Synthesizer also produces datasets based on
the system calls and signals that have been used in every pair of applications. This
is done for the purpose of training our machine learning-based classifier that can
be used to predict applications in a universe that can induce the reported fault.
Because the amount of information generated by virtual interleavings can be large,
it is cost effective to use the information to train a classifier that can be used in the
future. Our Dataset Synthesizer (DS) generates synthetic data based on VIs and
actual interleavings. These datasets are then used by our next component, Trainer
(component C) to train our proposed classifier.
Trainer (component C) takes three inputs. The first two inputs are generated
by Synthesizer; they are the lists of VIs and synthesized datasets. The third input
is the dataset consisting of interleavings from actual executions. Trainer uses both
types of datasets for both training and testing. We apply different machine learning
algorithms to build our classifier. Once Trainer is done building our classifier, we
use it to predict the result of each list of VIs. This allows our approach to identify a
subset of applications in a universe that can possibly induce the reported race.
Although the prediction results come from the well-trained classifier, they still need
to be verified to ensure that we have indeed identified fault-inducing applications. The
proposed Verifier (shown in Figure 6.7 as component D) performs this important
task. It takes two inputs: the lists of VIs from Synthesizer and the prediction
results from Trainer. The verification process leverages our prior work, RCRF.
However, other concurrency fault reproduction approaches can also be used. Once the
identified fault-inducing application has been verified, developers can use the actual
execution interleavings that produce faults as additional training data.
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It is worth noting that we make one assumption in this work. We assume that for
every reported application, the engineer working on replicating the reported faults
can access the path, branch, or def-use adequate test suite for that application. This
is reasonable as the application is being maintained or repaired by the same people
who developed it. In addition, because our work focuses on applications written for
Linux, the applications in the universe that we are using should be open-source so
accessing their test suites is also possible. Next, we provide a detailed description of
each CFI’s component.
6.3.1 Collector: Identify Race-Inducing Applications and
Relevant System Events
As the first step, an engineer analyzes an incomplete race report. At a minimum,
the engineer needs to be able to diagnose the reported faulty behaviors and identify
possible resources for which occurrences of that fault can be observed (e.g., files, shared
memory, system calls). Based on the identified resources, the engineer subsequently
identifies existing oracles that can detect the presence of such faults. Next, the engineer
executes the reported application using the existing test suite to generate a list of
kernel events. The list is analyzed along with lists from other applications in the
universe. If these lists do not yet exist, these applications will need to be executed
with their corresponding test suites to produce these lists.
Algorithm 4 shows how the proposed Collector gathers all the system kernel
event logs. CFI considers all feasible execution paths inside that application (Line 1)
by running the test suite (Line 2). It also considers all system kernel events (Line 3)
before filtering out duplicated and those irrelevant events (Line 4).
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A. Collector
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Kernel Event Logs 
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Kernel Event Logs 
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Figure 6.8: Workflow in The collector
Algorithm 4 The Collector and its filtering
Require: a list of application name fi (F ),
a list of test case tj (TC),
shared resource name (Sh),
a list of original kernel event log file and the line number of code (OSCLog),
a list of filtered kernel event log file and the line number of code (FSCLog),
a list of unique kernel event log file and the line number of code (USCLog)
1: for all fi ∈ F do
2: for all tj ∈ TC do
3: OSCLog(i,j) ← KernelEventLogTool(fi, ti)
4: FSCLog(i,j) ← FilterForReleventEventOnly(OSCLog(i,j), Sh)
5: end for
6: USCLogi ← Unique(FSCLog(i,j))
7: end for
8: return USCLog
6.3.2 Synthesizer: Generating the VIs and Synthesizing
Datasets for Classifier
As previously mentioned, this second feature has two sub-components, the Virtual
interleavings Generator (VIG) and the Dataset Synthesizer (DS). Both
components use information from the Collector to generate VIs and synthesize
datasets.
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B. SynthesizerOracles
Kernel Event Logs 
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Figure 6.9: Workflow in The synthesizer
6.3.2.1 Virtual interleavings Generator (VIG)
The Virtual interleaving Generator or VIG is a tool to generate Virtual
interleavings (VIs) that can be analyzed for possible faults without executing the
applications. In a nutshell, CFI can use these VIs to predict the outcome and verify
the result without performing exhaustive verification. VIG generates every possible
interleaving pattern as briefly illustrated in Figure 6.10.
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:1close 
2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink 
Virtual 
Interleaving 
Generator
(VIG)
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:1close:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink 
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink:1close 
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink:1read:1close 
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink:1read:1read:1close 
1stat64:1open:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink:1fstat64:1read:1read:1close 
1stat64:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:1close 
2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink:1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:1close 
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:2open:1close:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:2open:2fstat64:1close:2read:2read:2close:2unlink
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:2open:2fstat64:2read:1close:2read:2close:2unlink
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:1close:2close:2unlink
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:1read:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:1close:2unlink
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:2open:1read:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink:1close 
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:2open:2fstat64:1read:2read:2read:2close:2unlink:1close 
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:2open:2fstat64:2read:1read:2read:2close:2unlink:1close 
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:1read:2close:2unlink:1close 
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:1read:2unlink:1close 
1stat64:1open:1fstat64:1read:2open:2fstat64:2read:2read:2close:2unlink:1read:1close 
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. 
.
Figure 6.10: Examples of Virtual interleavings(VIs)
A Virtual interleaving (VI) is a representation of a possible interleaving can occur
when two applications run simultaneously and share the same resource and/or time.
The VIG simply runs all applications using test suites to produce kernel event logs
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that contain only relevant events and no duplicates. It then pairs up these events
one by one to create the list of VIs using the recursiveMergeList() as shown in the
Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 recursiveMergeList for Virtual interleaving Generator(VIG)
Require: The first list of system calls (L1),
The second list of system calls (L2),
The list of System calls for output (OL)
1: if (sizeof(L1) = 0 && sizeof(L2) = 0) then
2: addOutputAndClearList(O)
3: else
4: if (sizeof(L1) > 0) then
5: appendOneSC(OL, FirstToken(L1))
6: RecursiveMergeList(RemoveFirstToken(L1), L2, OL)
7: end if
8: if (sizeof(L2) > 0) then
9: appendOneSC(OL, FirstToken(L2))
10: RecursiveMergeList(L1, RemoveFirstToken(L2), OL)
11: end if
12: end if
6.3.2.2 Dataset Synthesizer (DS)
From our previous study of RCRF (see Chapter 4), two applications are concurrently
executed to generate actual interleavings. RCRF manipulates these actual and unique
interleavings to reproduce races. However, the number of unique interleavings tends
to be small (Table 4.3 reports only 308 unique interleavings). On the other hand,
CFI does not execute the applications. Instead, it analyzes all possible VIs to identify
possible faults. Therefore, our approach synthesizes data.
The Dataset Synthesizer or DS is a tool to collect working system calls
from both actual execution and VIs. It then synthesizes a new dataset for training
and testing our classifier. DS is a subprocess inside the synthesizer as shown in
Figure 6.9. Each data point in the dataset comes from a Happen-before graph of a
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list of system calls. The length of the sequence depends on the minimum requirement
of each Oracle (MinLengthRequiredByOracle). For example, the oracle in the case
of locate and updatedb requires at least 3 system calls to see if a shared file is
deleted before locate is done using it.
Each dataset that will be used by our classifier (discussed next) consists of one
feature matrix (discussed in Section 6.2) and one label as shown in Figure 6.11. It
represents one iteration of a parallel run of the vulnerable and inducing applications.
The interleavings between these two processes can create a faulty behavior, which the
oracle should be able to detect. The labels are numbers to indicate the type of faults.
In our study, we only use Boolean labels, true or false, to identify whether the fault
we are seeking is present.
One Label
One Feature Matrix
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Figure 6.11: Example of a dataset from running every interleaving between locate
and updatedb
To create a dataset, we first convert the feature matrix to a line of data as shown
in Figure 6.12. We merge the data line by line into a long row. We then append the
result from the oracle at the end of the row. This represents one line in the dataset.
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We repeat the process on every feature matrix until we have the entire dataset as
shown in the Figure 6.11.
1stat64 1open 1read 2stat64 2unlink 1close
1stat64 0 1 1 1 1 1
1open 0 0 1 1 1 1
1read 0 0 0 1 1 1
2stat64 0 0 0 0 1 1
2unlink 0 0 0 0 0 1
1close 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 + T
Oracle
011111001111000111000011000001000000 T
Figure 6.12: Transforming the feature matrix and evaluating the output from the
oracle into a line of dataset
Algorithmically, DS uses a recursive algorithm to generate the dataset as shown
in Algorithm 6. There are three inputs for this function. The first input is the list of
system calls or SC, the second is the output string or OutputString, and the last is
the counter or Loop. The main function of this DS calls this recursion function to
generate the dataset DataSynthesis(SC, ””,MinLengthRequiredByOracle).
In Algorithm 6, the termination condition is when the loop counter is less than
or equal to zero (Line 1). If the recursion has not terminated yet, it uses all of the
system calls (Line 2) to add into a new output string or newOutput (Line 3). This
newOutput is sent to the output if the Loop counter is down to 1 (Line 4). Then the
whole recursion moves forward (Line 7), decreasing the counter by 1.
The generated dataset is used by the next component for training and testing our
classifier.
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Algorithm 6 Data Synthesis (DS)
Require: The list of system calls (SC),
An output string (OutputString),
Loop counter (Loop)
1: if (Loop > 0) then
2: for all (sci) ∈ SC do
3: newOutput = OutputString + sci
4: if (Loop = 1) then
5: PrintOutput(newOutput)
6: end if
7: DataSynthesis(SC, newOutput, Loop− 1)
8: end for
9: end if
6.3.3 Trainer: Training and Testing the Classifier, then
Predicting the Results of VIs
The third main component of CFI is the Trainer that performs the process of
training and testing our classifier, which is subsequently used to predict whether VIs
can induce races. As shown in Figure 6.13, CFI receives the datasets from DS in
Synthesizer. Our classifier then performs the prediction on the VIs and reports the
prediction results for each of the VIs as the output of this component.
C. Trainer
Virtual Interleavings
(VIs) Dataset
Dataset from 
Previous runs
Prediction Results 
for each VIs
Figure 6.13: Workflow in Trainer
To determine what machine learning approaches to use, we experimented with five
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machine learning algorithms: Naive Bayes, Bayes Networks, ADTree, Random
Forrest, and SMO to train and compare the results. We used the split percentage
approach in Weka [109] to perform training and testing. In this approach, 90% of the
data is used for training and 10% of the data is used for testing. The dataset includes
the data from running Locate against five versions of the Backup application. Our
goal is to identify an algorithm that can predict accurately and can report the largest
number of true positives. We report our observations in Table 6.1. Column A lists
the algorithms used. Column B reports the time used by each algorithm to create
a classifier. Column C reports the number of instances that each algorithm used
for testing, which is 10% of the total number of instances. Column D reports the
average F-Measure score [110]. Column E to H report the classification results as True
Negatives (TN), False Negatives (FN), False Positives (FP), and True Positives (TP).
Table 6.1: Comparing the Results of Classification Algorithms
Algorithm
Building
Time
(second)
Testing
Instances
Average
F-Measure
True
Negative
False
Negative
False
Positive
True
Positive
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Naïve Bayes 8.52 3559 0.914 2094 267 46 1152
ADTree 1093.36 3559 0.845 2295 66 456 742
Random Forests 453.52 3559 0.991 2338 23 10 1188
SMO 2526.99 3559 0.976 2316 45 41 1157
Bayes Networks 37.78 3559 0.948 2183 178 11 1187
As shown in the table, the Random Forests algorithm performed best in our
investigation. It reported the highest F-Measure score while also achieving the
highest number of true positives. In addition, Random Forests is known to avoid
overfitting [111]. On the other hand, ADTree and SMO are not efficient. Naive
Bayes and Bayes Networks have a high number of errors on the prediction for
the False Negatives (Column F) and False Positives (Column G).
Next, we used our classifiers to perform predictions. We report the results using
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Table 6.2: Predicting the VIs of Locate-Backup using classifiers from different algorithms
Algorithm Virtualinterleavings
Predicted
Instances
True
Negative
False
Negative
False
Positive
True
Positive
Average
F-Measure
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Locate-Backup1 5 0 0 3 2
Locate-Backup2 15 5 0 5 5
Locate-Backup3 5 0 0 3 2
Locate-Backup4 5 0 0 3 2
Naïve Bayes
Locate-Backup5 15 15 0 0 0
0.709
Locate-Backup1 5 3 2 0 0
Locate-Backup2 15 0 0 10 5
Locate-Backup3 5 3 2 0 0
Locate-Backup4 5 3 2 0 0
ADTree
Locate-Backup5 15 15 0 0 0
0.661
Locate-Backup1 5 3 0 0 2
Locate-Backup2 15 7 0 3 5
Locate-Backup3 5 3 0 0 2
Locate-Backup4 5 2 0 1 2
Random Forests
Locate-Backup5 15 15 0 0 0
0.915
Locate-Backup1 5 0 0 3 2
Locate-Backup2 15 0 0 10 5
Locate-Backup3 5 0 0 3 2
Locate-Backup4 5 0 0 3 2
SMO
Locate-Backup5 15 15 0 0 0
0.594
Locate-Backup1 5 3 2 0 0
Locate-Backup2 15 0 5 0 10
Locate-Backup3 5 3 2 0 0
Locate-Backup4 5 3 2 0 0
Bayes Networks
Locate-Backup5 15 15 0 0 0
0.65
all five classifiers in Table 6.2. Column A lists the algorithms. Column B reports the
applications we pair with locate to generate VIs. Columns C to G are the number of
prediction instances as compared to the ground truth, which is the actual interleavings
that race. Column H is the average F-measure. Again, we observe that the Random
Forests algorithm still performs the best. It has a high number of True Negatives and
True Positives and low number of False Negatives and False Positives. The average
F-measure score is also the highest at 0.915.
After training and validating the classifier, we provide the VIs from the synthe-
sizer to the classifier to get the prediction results and save the results into a file
before passing them to the verifier to reproduce the race in the last step.
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6.3.4 Verifier: Confirming the Presence of Faults
By using VIs and our classifier, we can quickly identify applications in a universe
that can possibly race with the reported application. To ensure that the identified
application can induce concurrency faults with the reported application, we need to
verify the reproducibility of the reported fault. We implement Verifier by using
our proposed RCRF to execute these applications by focusing on the locations of the
system calls or signals that are part of the VIs identified as faulty.
Verifier needs the correct oracle for the targeted fault, the VIs from Synthe-
sizer, and the prediction results from Trainer as inputs and produces a final report
as output as shown in Figure 6.14.
D. Verifier
Results
Oracles
Virtual Interleavings
(VIs)
Prediction Results 
for each VIs
Figure 6.14: Workflow in The verifier
Verifier executes the interleavings repeatedly for a number of times (10 times
in our case) to reduce non-determinism. If the faulty behaviors can be detected,
Verifier then flags that interleaving as faulty in the final report. With the help of
Oracle, the real faults found in this process can be confirmed.
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6.4 A Case Study
Our case study focuses on how well CFI can help developers debug concurrency faults
when only incomplete bug reports that do not contain information about the inducing
applications are available. To find an inducing application that can cause a reported
fault, CFI needs to efficiently analyze all applications in a universe along with the
reported application. To make the process efficient, CFI uses a classifier to predict
inducing applications to achieve better performance than an ordinary exhaustive
approach that needs to run every application and exercise every interleaving. Clearly,
the accuracy and efficiency of predictions are the two main performance metrics. As
such, our evaluation aims answer the following two research questions.
RQ1: How effective is CFI compared to the exhaustive approach for finding the
inducing applications?
RQ2: How efficient is CFI compared to the exhaustive approach for finding the
inducing applications?
6.4.1 Objects of Analysis
We consider 117 open-source applications running on Linux 2.6.35+, including the
applications described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. Because CFI analyzes system call
usage, we further cluster the universe of applications into four groups using a simple
k-Mean clustering algorithm based on their system call usages. We then identify
which cluster to use based on the similarity between the system call usage of the
reported application and the applications in a cluster. Table 6.3 reports the result
after clustering.
Next, we identify applications in each cluster that access the same shared resources
as the reported application. Our investigation in this study is based on the locate-
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Table 6.3: Universe of Applications
Cluster
No.
List of Applciations Percentage
1 backup1, backup2, backup3, backup4, backup5, bash, migrate1,
migrate2, migrate3, migrate4, migrate5, stealer, restore1,
restore2, restore3, updatedb, zipper
14.53%
2 cp, date, dd, deadlock, dir, find, grep, ls, nice, nohup, pr, pxz,
shred, shuf, sort, touch, vlc
14.53%
3 audacious, banshee, chromium, dia, inkscape, mixxx, opera 5.98%
4 base64, basename, cat, chgrp, chmod, chown, cksum, comm,
csplit, cut, df, dircolors, dirname, du, echo, env, expand, expr,
factor, false, fmt, fold, head, hostid, hostname, id, join, kill,
link, ln, locate, logname, logroate, mSigShooter, md5sum,
mkdir, mkfifo, mknod, mv, nl, od, paste, pathchk, pinky, printf,
printenv, ps, ptx, pwd, readlink, rm, rmdir, seq, sleep, split,
stat, stty, su, sum, sync, tac, tail, tee, test, true, tsort, tty,
uname, unexpand, uniq, unlink, uptime, users, wc, whoami, yes
64.96%
updatedb bug report [37]. Table 6.4 shows the list of applications grouped by clusters
(the second column). We also list applications that access similar shared resources (the
last column). The total number of applications that we need to consider is reduced to
42 applications as shown in the last column.
Table 6.4: The applications after refinement
Cluster
No.
List of Applciations List of Applications
that touch the shared resource
1 backup1, backup2, backup3, backup4,
backup5, bash, migrate1, migrate2,
migrate3, migrate4, migrate5, stealer,
restore1, restore2, restore3, updatedb,
zipper
backup1, backup2, backup3, backup4,
backup5, migrate1, migrate2, migrate3,
migrate4, migrate5, restore1, restore2,
restore3, updatedb
2 cp, date, dd, deadlock, dir, find, grep,
ls, nice, nohup, pr, pxz, shred, shuf,
sort, touch, vlc
cp, grep, ls, pr, pxz, shuf, sort, touch
3 audacious, banshee, chromium, dia,
inkscape, mixxx, opera
-
4 base64, basename, cat, chgrp, chmod,
chown, cksum, comm, csplit, cut, df,
dircolors, dirname, du, echo, env, expr,
expand, factor, false, fmt, fold, head,
hostid, hostname, id, join, kill, link,
ln,locate, logname, logroate, md5sum,
mSigShooter, mkdir, mkfifo, mknod,
mv, nl, od, paste, pathchk, printenv,
pinky, printf, ps, ptx, pwd, readlink,
rm, rmdir, seq, sleep, split, stat, stty,
su, sum, sync, tac, tail, tee, test, true,
tsort, tty, uname, unexpand, uniq,
unlink, uptime, users, wc, whoami, yes
cat, csplit, cut, fold, head, join, ln,
locate, mv, od, paste, ptx, rm, split,
sum, tac, tail, tee, unlink, wc
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6.4.2 Variables and Measures
Independent Variable. To assess effectiveness (RQ1) we wish to compare the
effectiveness of CFI with that of the baseline approach from Chapter 4. To do so, we
count the number of the applications in which we can detect faults. We consider all of
the potential interleavings between the vulnerable application and the list of inducing
applications on the same input and execution environment.
For the baseline technique, we use RCRF, which is an exhaustive approach to run
every possible pair of applications to reproduce races. On the other hand, CFI uses a
predictive approach.
Dependent Variable. To assess the cost of CFI, we measure the wall clock times
needed to completely execute the baseline approach and CFI. We also count the
number of correctly predicted race-inducing applications.
6.4.3 Study Methodology
We conduct our study using a report for locate-updatedb [37]. Based on the bug
report, the vulnerable application is locate and the fault can be observed in a shared
file locatedb. We then try to identify applications in our universe that also try to
access the same shared file. These applications can possibly induce the reported race.
Next, we identify the oracles that can possibly detect occurrences of the reported fault.
Last, we apply both approaches to identify applications that can induce the reported
fault. We report the iteration that reproduces the reported fault and the time taken
from the start of the process to reproduce the fault. Both approaches terminate as
soon as a fault is found (referred to as early termination).
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6.4.4 Threats to Validity
The primary threat to external validity in this study involves the object programs uti-
lized. We have included only 117 open-source programs. Moreover, these applications
may not be representative of the actual applications running on the user’s system
when a reported fault occurred. We apply our system only to one case but since the
set of data used by CFI is similar to that used by RCRF, we anticipate that we can
apply CFI to other types of concurrency faults. However, we still need to conduct
further studies to verify the results when CFI is applied to other fault types.
The primary threat to internal validity includes potential errors in the implementa-
tion of CFI and the infrastructure used to run both CFI and the exhaustive approach.
To limit these errors we extensively validated all of the components and scripts.
The primary threat to construct validity relates to the fact that we study effec-
tiveness and savings relative to applications of CFI, but do not yet assess whether
the approach helps engineers localize and correct targeted faults more quickly than
current approaches.
6.4.5 Results
Table 6.5 reports data showing the effectiveness of CFI. Column A lists the vulnerable
program, which is locate in this study. Column B lists all the applications in the
universe that utilize similar system calls as those in the vulnerable program. Clustering
based on system call usage results in 42 applications that we need to investigate.
Column C is the total number of interleavings in each pair of applications that can
possibly race. Columns D and E report the results of employing the exhaustive
approach that uses RCRF to run every pair of applications. Column D reports the
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Table 6.5: Effectiveness of CFI
Real Race Found (Early Termination)
Exhaustive Approach CFI
App1 App2 TotalInterleavings TotalInterleavings
Running
Race
Found
Total
Interleavings
Running
Race
Found
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
locate backup1 5 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate backup2 15 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate backup3 5 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate backup4 5 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate backup5 15 15 No - -
locate cat 35 35 No - -
locate cp 336 336 No - -
locate csplit 5 5 No - -
locate cut 15 15 No - -
locate fold 15 15 No - -
locate grep 15 15 No - -
locate head 15 15 No - -
locate join 70 70 No - -
locate ln 10 10 No - -
locate locate 70 70 No - -
locate ls 15 15 No - -
locate migrate1 5 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate migrate2 5 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate migrate3 5 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate migrate4 5 5 No - -
locate migrate5 15 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate mv 35 35 No - -
locate od 70 70 No - -
locate paste 15 15 No - -
locate pr 70 70 No - -
locate ptx 70 70 No - -
locate pxz 126 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate restore1 5 5 No - -
locate restore2 5 5 No - -
locate restore3 5 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate rm 5 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate shuf 700 700 No - -
locate sort 1260 1260 No - -
locate split 15 15 No - -
locate sum 15 15 No - -
locate tac 15 15 No - -
locate tail 35 35 No - -
locate tee 35 35 No - -
locate touch 5 5 No - -
locate unlink 5 2 Yes 1 Yes
locate updatedb 35 3 Yes 2 Yes
locate wc 35 35 No - -
number of exercised interleavings for each pair of applications, and Column E reports
the number of uncovered races.
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Columns F and G report the results of employing CFI to predict and then RCRF
to verify the prediction results. Note that we run only the pairs of applications that
have been predicted by CFI to possibly race. For the pairs of applications that CFI
does not predict to have races, we simply enter “-” in the corresponding cells. We
apply early termination when possible (i.e., stop testing with RCRF as soon as a
race is uncovered). The effect of early termination is that the number of exercised
interleavings is fewer than the number of all interleavings that should be explored.
For example, there are 15 possible interleavings that can cause backup2 to race with
Locate. However, with early termination, the exhaustive approach can uncover the
reported race after exercising only two interleavings. Once the race is uncovered, the
execution of RCRF terminates.
Table 6.6: Prediction Accuracy of CFI
Prediction by CFI
No Race Race
No Race 29 0Actual Result Race 0 13
To answer the first research question, Table 6.5 clearly shows that CFI can
effectively predict applications that can race with locate. In fact, Table 6.6 shows
that its prediction is 100% correct; i.e., every predicted pair of applications does
contain races. CFI also does not miss any pair of applications that contains races.
Furthermore, by being able to investigate only the interleavings that are likely to
race, we can take advantage of the early termination policy in all but one pair of
applications.
With respect to the second research question, we report the experimental results in
Table 6.7. Again, Columns A and B are the pairs of the applications that we explore.
Column C reports the execution time (wall-clock time) needed by RCRF to exercise
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Table 6.7: Efficiency of CFI
Exhaustive Approach CFI
App1 App2 Processing
Time
No of tested
Interleavings
Processing
Time
No of tested
Interleavings
Time
Difference
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
locate backup1 00:07:44 2 00:05:36 1 00:02:08
locate backup2 00:11:27 2 00:08:28 1 00:02:59
locate backup3 00:07:22 2 00:05:21 1 00:02:01
locate backup4 00:07:19 2 00:05:15 1 00:02:04
locate backup5 07:09:21 15 - - -
locate cat 01:26:30 35 - - -
locate cp 14:30:40 336 - - -
locate csplit 00:10:40 5 - - -
locate cut 00:31:40 15 - - -
locate fold 00:35:17 15 - - -
locate grep 00:45:01 15 - - -
locate head 00:34:53 15 - - -
locate join 03:00:02 70 - - -
locate ln 00:21:54 10 - - -
locate locate 05:42:36 70 - - -
locate ls 00:33:49 15 - - -
locate migrate1 00:09:33 2 00:06:45 1 00:02:48
locate migrate2 00:09:59 2 00:07:04 1 00:02:55
locate migrate3 00:32:56 2 00:06:00 1 00:26:56
locate migrate4 00:27:15 5 - - -
locate migrate5 00:09:09 2 00:07:08 1 00:02:01
locate mv 01:17:25 35 - - -
locate od 07:05:10 70 - - -
locate paste 00:32:11 15 - - -
locate pr 02:54:14 70 - - -
locate ptx 03:00:58 70 - - -
locate pxz 00:26:57 2 00:25:23 1 00:01:34
locate restore1 00:27:02 5 - - -
locate restore2 00:27:22 5 - - -
locate restore3 00:07:05 2 00:05:05 1 00:02:00
locate rm 00:04:44 2 00:02:51 1 00:01:53
locate shuf 02:55:28 700 - - -
locate sort 05:17:28 1260 - - -
locate split 00:35:26 15 - - -
locate sum 00:34:46 15 - - -
locate tac 00:34:52 15 - - -
locate tail 01:25:59 35 - - -
locate tee 01:19:31 35 - - -
locate touch 00:10:55 5 - - -
locate unlink 00:11:02 2 00:02:50 1 00:08:12
locate updatedb 00:36:09 3 00:28:38 2 00:07:31
locate wc 01:25:13 35 - - -
Summary for CFI 68:55:04 01:56:24 66:58:40
each pair of applications. Column D reports the number of interleavings that RCRF
exercises. Column E reports the execution time needed by RCRF to uncover one race
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in a predicted pair of applications. Column G reports the time difference between the
time in Column C and time in the Column E.
Table 6.8: Efficiency of CFI
Exhaustive Approach CFI
App1 App2 Processing
Time
No of tested
Interleaves
Processing
Time
No of tested
Interleaves
Time
Difference
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
locate backup1 00:07:44 2 00:05:36 1 00:02:08
locate backup2 00:11:27 2 00:08:28 1 00:02:59
locate backup3 00:07:22 2 00:05:21 1 00:02:01
locate backup4 00:07:19 2 00:05:15 1 00:02:04
locate migrate1 00:09:33 2 00:06:45 1 00:02:48
locate migrate2 00:09:59 2 00:07:04 1 00:02:55
locate migrate3 00:32:56 2 00:06:00 1 00:26:56
locate migrate5 00:09:09 2 00:07:08 1 00:02:01
locate pxz 00:26:57 2 00:25:23 1 00:01:34
locate restore3 00:07:05 2 00:05:05 1 00:02:00
locate rm 00:04:44 2 00:02:51 1 00:01:53
locate unlink 00:11:02 2 00:02:50 1 00:08:12
locate updatedb 00:36:09 3 00:28:38 2 00:07:31
Summary for CFI 03:01:26 01:56:24 01:05:02
There are three points to take away from the reported data.
1. Employing CFI has the potential to allow engineers to spend less time to test
these applications. As our result collaborates, the reduction in the testing time
is nearly 67 hours. This translate to 35 times speed-up of the testing time of
CFI over that of the exhaustive approach.
2. For each pair of applications, CFI provides precise information about interleav-
ings that can cause races in each pair of applications so that the exploration
time is also significantly shorter. Table 6.8 clearly collaborates this point. The
table shows the 13 pairs of apps that can race. Because CFI prioritizes execu-
tions of interleavings that can cause races, it would be able to terminate each
verification run faster than the exhaustive approach that does not prioritize
which interleaving to execute first. We see a reduction of 1 hour and 5 minutes
or 36% in execution time when CFI is used to uncover the first race in a pair
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of applications instead of when the exhaustive approach is used to uncover the
first race in the same pair of applications.
3. The use of CFI can potentially allow an engineer to quickly identify one
application that can induce races with the reported application. In our case
study, executing any of the applications predicted by CFI to contain the
reported fault would immediately uncover the reported fault. On the other
hand, the chance that the first application executed by the exhaustive approach
would uncover the reported fault is only 13
42
or 31%.
6.5 Discussion
Column F in Table 6.5 shows that 12 out of 13 pairs of applications need to exercise
only one interleaving to reproduce the reported races. The exception is Locate and
UpdateDB, which needs to exercise two interleavings before uncovering a race. This
shows the power of CFI to pinpoint the interleavings that can cause races. Also,
notice that there are many applications with one or more variations that cause races
and others that do not. This shows that CFI is sensitive to some subtle changes.
To further investigate the pair of two interleavings that needs to be exercise, we
illustrate a subset of VIs generated by CFI for that pair (locate-updatedb) in
Figure 6.15. Figure 6.16 illustrates the results of exercising the interleavings by RCRF.
0:0:?:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
1:0:?:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:1Wclose:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
2:0:?:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
3:0:?:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:1Wclose:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
.
.
.
Figure 6.15: The example of virtual interleavings generated from locate-updatedb
Our analysis of the runtime trace indicates that the sleep injection technique used
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by RCRF cannot inject a sleep statement between system calls fstatat64 and unlinkat.
As such, we cannot enforce the first predicted interleaving (first line in Figure 6.15).
However, in the second line, the predicted interleaving has Wclose in between fstatat64
and unlinkat. Our system can enforce this particular interleaving and uncovers a race
(as shown in Figure 6.16).
updatedb00010001:0:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010001:1:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010001:2:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010001:3:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010001:4:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010001:5:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010001:6:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010001:7:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010001:8:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010001:9:ludb0:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:1Wclose:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:0:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:1:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:2:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:3:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:4:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:5:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:6:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:7:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:8:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
updatedb00010002:9:ludb1:1Rstat64:1Wopen:1Wfstat64:1Wread:1Wread:2Rfstatat64:2Wunlinkat:1Wclose:2Rstat64:2Rlstat64:2Wrename:2Rstat64:2Wfchmodat
Figure 6.16: The log file from executing the interleavings from locate-updatedb
6.6 Related Work
Previous work on race reproduction including RCRF, RacePro [3], and Sim-
Racer [66] requires that engineers specify pairs of applications that race (we discussed
these approaches in Chapter 4.6). As such, they do need complete bug reports that
disclose such information. Our work supplements these approaches by extending
their abilities to tackle race reproduction even when bug reports are incomplete.
(Specifically, when bug reports do not contain any information about race-inducing
applications.)
A large class of concurrency fault detectors focus their efforts on applying dynamic
analysis on actual interleavings [16, 28, 74, 75, 77, 112]. For examples, DORA [113], an
adaptive version of RacePro [3], performs concurrency bug prevention by mutating
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interleavings and employing record-and-replay of interleavings to avoid concurrency
faults. iDNA-Recorder [114] and iDNA-Replayer [115] perform record and replay
at the binary execution level with data race analysis of Happens-Before relationships
to prevent the fault. Dynamically detecting faults makes sense because, after all,
concurrency faults occur dynamically. However, the main short-coming of such
approaches is inefficiency. Exercising interleavings by precisely controlling their
execution orders can result in significant runtime overhead and probe effects. CFI
takes a different approach by using classifier-based prediction to identify pairs of
applications and interleavings within each pair of applications that can race. Our case
study shows that the proposed approach can be effective and efficient.
There are also prior studies that apply machine learning to detect and prevent
concurrency faults. Atom-Aid [116] is a hardware-supported system to detect atom-
icity violations when concurrent programs try to access memory. the authors propose
to use machine learning to achieve their goal. The work has not been released at the
moment. NNPIN [117] extends the PIN tool [67] to build neural networks in hardware
to detect atomicity violations in file accesses. The initial results show promise but
more detailed investigation is still needed.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a new approach to empower engineers to be more effective
at reproducing and debugging data races. Because races can be difficult to diagnose by
users during deployment, they can submit bug reports that are not complete. As such,
these reports may not be useful in helping engineers to debug the reported faults.
We introduce CFI, a framework that can help engineers fill in missing information
in incomplete bug reports. Specifically, CFI focuses on filling in information in bug
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reports that do not disclose race-inducing applications. CFI aims to help an engineer
identify applications that are accessible to her and that can possibly race with the
reported application. Identifying applications can help the engineer reproduce the
reported race.
The greatest benefit of CFI is its predictive power. By using prediction, it can
significantly reduce the number of applications that must be tested for races. Our case
study shows that CFI is accurate and can save a significant amount of testing time.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have designed and implemented three complementatry frameworks that
can help developers reproduce process-level concurrency faults. The three proposed
frameworks target three critical problems in reproducing concurrency faults which are:
1. dealing with executing non-determinism,
2. assisting developers in constructing oracles to detect various forms of concur-
rency faults, and
3. filling in the missing information in incomplete race reports submitted by users.
The three proposed frameworks establish a good starting point to address the
complex issue of reproducing and debugging concurrency faults. In this chapter, we
propose the next steps that should be taken to further advance state-of-the-art in this
important research area.
With respect to the RCRF, we should explore additional types of concurrency
faults to see if our framework can still replicate them. This will allow RCRF to
be more general and can have much broader capability to tackle various types of
concurrency faults. In addition, we should develop better user interfaces for RCRF.
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Lastly, we should investigate the effectiveness of this tool in real-world testing and
debugging environments.
With respect to RDSC, we would like to be able to create more generic oracles
that can cover a broader range of concurrency faults including order violation, lock
contention, and priority inversion.
With respect of CFI, we need to conduct more studies to evaluate the generality of
this framework. If we can maintain the same level of accuracy, we may be able to use
prediction alone to detect race. It can also be applied in scenarios where organizations
want to ensure that newly installed applications would not negatively interact with
existing applications that can lead to concurrency faults.
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